The NDAA freezes E-3, F-15E and A-10 retirements, accelerates F/A-XX and F-47 oversight, and demands a concrete plan for post-E-6B nuclear command-and-control.
The Fiscal Year 2026 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) advanced another step toward becoming law this week after the House approved the measure in a 312–112 vote. The nearly $900 billion defense policy package will now go to the Senate for final consideration.
The bill has been developed through months of bipartisan negotiations and establishes broad national security priorities while issuing detailed guidance on force structure, modernization, and oversight across the U.S. military.
The NDAA directs several high-impact reviews and mandates that could shape the future of key aviation programs of the U.S. military. Among them are the Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) mission, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) requirements, the Air Force’s F-47 Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, and the Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation carrier-based aircraft.
As the Department of Defense continues to balance modernization timelines with industrial-base capacity and long-term strategic demand, the FY2026 legislation asserts congressional intent to maintain program continuity and avoid capability gaps in critical mission areas.
Airborne Command Post Mission
One of the NDAA’s most detailed aviation provisions concerns the Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) capability, also known as “Looking Glass,” which provides survivable, airborne command-and-control connectivity with U.S. strategic forces. Notably, the bill imposes a limitation on Air Force travel expenditures, withholding 20% of the budget, until the department submits a comprehensive report on the ABNCP acquisition strategy, underscoring congressional concern about the absence of a clearly articulated post-E-6B plan.
In fact, since the announcement of the selection of the E-130J Phoenix II as replacement for the E-6B Mercury, concerns have surrounded the decision to not integrate the ABNCP capability. Reports mentioned an unconfirmed possibility of the Air Force’s new E-4C Survivable Airborne Operations Centre (SAOC) inheriting the mission, but details on this are scarce.
Because of this, the NDAA requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with U.S. Strategic Command, to provide Congress with an acquisition strategy addressing two key areas: the prospects of using the C-130J-30 for the ABNCP mission and the relationship between ABNCP and the Secondary Launch Platform-Airborne (SLP-A) effort.
Regarding the former, the report must assess “the potential for expanding production of the C-130J-30 Super Hercules to provide additional airframes to preserve the Airborne Command Post capability.” This language appears to signal congressional interest in exploring a platform that is already undergoing extensive modification by the Navy for the TACAMO mission, although it is unclear if this is suggesting to integrate the ABNCP mission together with the TACAMO mission on the E-130J or creating two separate variants of the aircraft, one for each mission.
As for the latter key area, the NDAA requires an evaluation of how the future ABNCP capability aligns with the Secondary Launch Platform–Airborne architecture, which will replace the Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS). This system provides survivable connectivity and launch control for intercontinental ballistic missiles and will be central to future LGM-35 Sentinel operations.
Preservation of Airborne Early Warning Capacity
The NDAA also includes provisions aimed at ensuring continuity in the Air Force’s Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) mission. The goal is to prevent a capability gap as the E-3 fleet continues to age and becomes increasingly difficult to sustain and operate.
Notably, the bill prohibits the Air Force from retiring or placing into storage any E-3 aircraft that would reduce the active fleet below 16 aircraft. However, two possible exceptions are also mentioned, either a submission of a readiness and mission-continuity plan or the procurement of a sufficient number of E-7 aircraft to cover required mission needs.
The legislative intent is to maintain minimum airborne early warning capacity until replacement capability is assured. Congress has historically used fleet-retirement restrictions to preserve capacity during transitions.
At the same time, the NDAA also forbids the use of FY2026 funds to terminate the mid-tier acquisition rapid prototype contract for the E–7A and the operations of the E-7A’s production line. This further affirms the intent of Congress that the Air Force maintain momentum on replacing the E-3 and continue work on the E-7 program
This approach mirrors past NDAAs where Congress directed procurement sequencing to avoid operational risk, particularly in areas where aging fleets face declining availability. Many already argued that the Air Force can’t afford a gap in the long-range AEW&C capabilities, especially as it prepares to operate over the Indo-Pacific’s vast distances.
F/A-XX Program
The Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives said in a printout packet that the FY2026 NDAA includes “full funding” for both the F-47 and F/A-XX 6th generation aircraft programs. This appeared to signal strong congressional support for the Navy’s F/A-XX, the future carrier-based fighter intended to replace the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
As a matter of fact, the NDAA full text shows that only $74 million allocated for the Navy’s new fighter, whose official designation in the document is Next Generation Fighter. However, more funding might come from another line in the funding: Link Plumeria.
Link Plumeria is a classified special access program (SAP) focused on advanced component development and prototyping. F/A-XX has often been described as a major component of Link Plumeria in official budget documentation.
The Pentagon says it is concerned about maintaining a robust aerospace industrial base capable of supporting simultaneously both F-47 and F/A-XX programs. Navy officials ultimately emphasize the need to preserve momentum behind the F/A-XX.
Oversight for the F-47
The NDAA imposes one of its most comprehensive reporting requirements on the Air Force’s F-47 advanced fighter aircraft, mandating a detailed program report no later than Mar. 1, 2027. Lawmakers intend to have a heightened congressional oversight of the service’s premier tactical modernization effort.
The required report must include a full description of the F-47 program, with requirements, employment concepts, and projected costs, schedules; acquisition pathway options, specifically whether the program should follow a major capability acquisition pathway or a middle-tier acquisition approach; a proposed fielding strategy, with force structure requirements, basing considerations, required military construction, personnel training needs, and integration plans for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
Last but not least, Congress wants in the report an additional oversight on future production profiles, reflecting concerns that the F-47 could significantly impact future aircraft procurement cycles. This is a notable aspect as many already noted concerns regarding the capability to support multiple next generation aircraft programs.
A-10 and F-15E Retirements
The FY2026 NDAA also addresses the Air Force’s ongoing retirement plans for two legacy combat aircraft: the A-10 Thunderbolt II and the F-15E Strike Eagle. The service is planning for drastic cuts, although Congress uses the authorization process to ensure that reductions occur in a deliberate, strategically aligned manner.
In fact, the NDAA continues the multi-year approach by Congress of allowing limited A-10 divestment while ensuring that the Air Force maintains sufficient close air support capacity. Notably, the NDAA underscores the requirement for the Air Force to demonstrate how remaining units will sustain readiness and meet combatant command demand.
The official text reads that 93 A-10s must be designated as primary mission aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory until Oct. 1, 2026, and the service can’t decrease the total inventory below 103 aircraft. The Air Force still operates a total of 162 A-10s.
Also, the Congress demands no later than Mar. 31, 2026, a briefing on the status of the A-10 fleet and the Air Force’s proposed divestment plan until FY2029, the original retirement date. Among the requests for the briefing is a detailed plan for the divestment of the aircraft assigned to each unit and how the service intends to replace the A-10, either with new or existing aircraft.
Similarly, the FY2026 NDAA acknowledges the Air Force’s intent to begin retiring the oldest F-15E Strike Eagles as part of modernization planning. However, rather than a complete retirement like the Air Force planned, the bill requires the service to maintain a minimum number of combat-coded aircraft, and only up to 51 aircraft might be retired.
Notably, the document specifies that no F-15E may be retired during FY2026, while 21 and 30 aircraft may be retired in FY2027 and FY2028, respectively. About 230 F-15Es are still in service, of which 130 with the older Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 engines (the ones the Air Force wanted to retire) and 99 with the newer F100-PW-229 engines.
FLRAA Early Production
The FY2026 NDAA also advances the Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program, marking a significant step in the service’s broader Future Vertical Lift (FVL) modernization strategy. While FLRAA remains in engineering and manufacturing development, lawmakers authorize the Army to enter into accelerated early production contracts ahead of full-rate procurement.
This allows the service to begin limited acquisition of MV-75 FLRAA airframes once key developmental milestones are achieved. This early-production authority is intended to prevent schedule drift, ensure industrial-base alignment, and position the Army to conduct initial fielding activities on time.
The NDAA also directs the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with a detailed briefing within 180 days of enactment. That report must outline the implementation plan for early production, industrial-base and supply-chain readiness, expected long-term cost savings, projected operational benefits, and how FLRAA fielding will synchronize with reductions or transitions in legacy platforms.
At the same time, the Secretary is required to prioritize program continuity, cost-efficiency, and workforce retention, ensuring that aircraft procured as part of the early production incorporate lessons learned from test article evaluations, and ensure the aircraft completes a rigorous developmental test flight campaign before delivery to operational forces and full-rate production. The added oversight reflects lawmakers’ concerns about fielding the MV-75 too early while design work is still maturing.
