Tag Archives: Kim Jong-un

Fiction Story: A B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Is Downed During An Air Strike On A North Korean Nuclear Site

A “what if” story.

Disclaimer: this story contains some “poetic licenses” to make the fictional scenario more interesting.

03:19 Hr.s Local. 35,000 feet, B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber “Spirit of Arizona”, 15 miles west of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

The B-2 Spirit stealth bomber is nearly invisible to radar. But not bullets.

Pulling off target after a massive precision strike on the North Korean nuclear weapons development facility at Yongbyon, North Korea, B-2 Spirit number 82-1067, the “Spirit of Arizona” was leaving the target area at medium altitude and high-speed. The aircraft was configured for minimum radar and signals observability with all lights retracted and emissions restricted. Spirit of Arizona was one of three B-2’s that leveled the nuclear research facility in a massive conventional bombing raid, the largest of the New Korean War so far. While it would take a few hours to collect bomb damage assessment data the satellite images would show the raid was a complete success, with the entire research facility, storage areas and the reactors themselves being completely devastated in a hail of precision-guided 2,000 lb bombs.

Now all the crew of Spirit of Arizona had to do was get themselves and their nearly invisible, completely defenseless, two billion dollar aircraft out of the most heavily defended airspace in the world and back to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, in CONUS (Continental US).

03:22 Hr.s Local. 37,800 feet, North Korean MiG-29 Fulcrum, 28 miles southwest of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Sojwa (Major) Kim Si Gwok had more hours in MiG-29 Fulcrums than every other North Korean fighter pilot except for two. He did have the most time flying the Fulcrum using night vision goggles, a particular distinction considering the North Korean Air Force did not have enough night vision goggles compatible with the MiG-29 for all the aircraft they owned. That distinction put Maj. Gwok on CAP (Combat Air Patrol) in his MiG-29 tonight over the critically strategic target of Yongbyon as part of the air defense for the facility. That the American stealth bombers had already gotten through to hit the nuclear facility was a major failure for the North Koreans.

Maj. Gwok knew Yongbyon had been hit within the last few minutes, likely by cruise missiles or American stealth bombers. Gwok couldn’t do much about the cruise missiles. He read about British Spitfire pilots in WWII who had defeated the first cruise missile, the German V-1, by flying next to them and flipping them over with their wingtip. That would be impossible with the low altitude American Tomahawks. But, if there were stealth bombers in the area that he may be able to shoot down, he was going to try to find them. As a lifelong combat pilot he felt he had a sense of what the enemy’s egress route from the target might be, the shortest distance to the coast.  So that was where he went looking for the “invisible” American stealth bombers.

In March 1999 the Yugoslavians used a combination of ground based observers and expert search radar operators to shoot down an F-117 stealth fighter. It was a lucky shot, a golden BB, and it proved stealth wasn’t invulnerable. Major Gwok knew this. He knew that, other than stealth, the American batwing bombers were defenseless. If he could see one, he could shoot it down.

03:28 Hr.s Local. 35,000 feet, B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber “Spirit of Arizona”, 41 miles west of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Mission Commander, Capt. Bill Myers of Pensacola, Florida and Aircraft Commander, Maj. Dave Evans of Boulder, Colorado were getting constant secure updates on the air defense environment through their secure datalinks onboard Spirit of Arizona as she ran toward the coast after hitting Yongbyon. The three strike aircraft followed different egress routes in the very unlikely event an enemy aircraft or air defense crew could somehow visually acquire one of the B-2’s at night. Since the B-2 was a fast, subsonic aircraft, was relatively quiet, painted black to blend with the night sky and operated at altitudes to avoid contrails the chances of an enemy fighter pilot visually acquiring them was almost zero. But not absolute zero. Myers and Evans knew the entire North Korean air defense network would be up looking for them with everything they had. Even with the most sophisticated combat aircraft in history they still had to get out of North Korean airspace without being seen.

A KC-135 Strantotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing refuels a B-2 Spirit from the 509th Bomb Wing in the late hours of Jan. 18, 2017, during a mission that targeted Islamic State training camps in Libya. The B-2’s low-observability provides it greater freedom of action at high altitudes, thus increasing its range and a better field of view for the aircraft’s sensors. Its unrefueled range is approximately 6,000 nautical miles (9,600 kilometers). (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Kate Thornton)

03:29 Hr.s Local. 37,700 feet, North Korean MiG-29 Fulcrum, 47 miles southeast of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Gwok didn’t really see the American stealth bomber as much as he saw what appeared to be a slit in the night sky. Reflected light from humid air at lower altitudes cast a low, soft glow upward from the ground below. The sky had a gently silver tinge to its black emptiness except for a small sliver of dead black below and to the left of Gwok’s MiG. Not knowing the sensor capabilities of the American stealth bomber, if that is what he saw, Gwok turned gradually to align himself with what he thought was his potential target’s heading. He gently moved the stick forward and, as his MiG closed the distance to the sliver of black the descent also added airspeed. His approach was perfect, high and behind. If he was right, this looked too easy.

03:29 Hr.s Local. 34,000 feet, B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber “Spirit of Arizona”, 51 miles west of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Myers and Evans knew they were in deep trouble. AWACs told them over secure, stealthy datalink  communications that there was an enemy aircraft high and behind them. There was a remote chance it could visually acquire them. There was nothing they could do except recheck the low observable settings and the make sure the throttles were firewalled so they could get out of North Korean airspace as quickly and invisibly as possible. If it wasn’t already too late.

03:30 Hr.s Local. 37,700 feet, North Korean MiG-29 Fulcrum, 49 miles southeast of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Gwok wasn’t quite sure it was an American stealth bomber at first. Through his visor, the night vision goggles and his canopy the image was ghosted and dark. A black slit in the otherwise pixellated sky. Then two bright rectangles of green bloomed in front of him; the exhaust heat from the B-2’s four engines. Even though they are channeled and louvered to prevent a large infra-red signature from below they still pump out a lot of heat as seen from above. That heat lit up Major Gwok’s night vision goggles. His fingers flew over his console to unsafe his GSh-30-1 cannon. The instant the safety selector was slewed to “FIRE” his gloved finger clamped down on the trigger at the front of his stick. The 30 millimeter cannon tore off a succession of white-hot shells in a bright line of arcing white dots perforating the night sky. They expanded out in a wide curve and faded. Gwok jinked hard right, largely from instinct but also to avoid overrunning his target or even colliding with it. He didn’t know if he scored a hit. He pulled hard back and right on his stick, describing a tight circle to come around and see if he could spot the black stealth bomber.

As Gwok finished his tight 360-degree turn and rolled wings level he saw something trailing flame through the night sky, cartwheeling straight down toward the earth like a black, burning boomerang.

03:30 Hr.s Local. 34,400 feet, B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber “Spirit of Arizona”, 55 miles southeast of Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea.

Alarms lit off inside the cockpit. The nose went down and Evans tried to add power and gently pull back but there was no perceivable control response. The aircraft began to shudder, then pivot oddly beneath them. It was falling apart. The G-load increased and the aircraft entered a spin like a boomerang. Evans got one hand between his legs and into the ejection handle as he said, out loud into his mask, “EJECT, EJECT, EJECT!”. Myers never heard him. He may have been fighting the losing battle to save the aircraft, he may have been wounded, he may have been dead. He never made it to the ejector seat handles.

The B-2 spun nearly 180 degrees in the air, nosed down and began to topple like a kite freed of its broken string. The top of the flying wing’s fuselage exploded in a spit of flame as Maj. Dave Evans’ ACES II ejection seat rocketed free. It flipped end over end at first, falling through 15,000 feet until it stabilized somewhat. At 10,000 feet the barometric altimeter automatically released Evans from the seat and his parachute began to deploy. The ejection, like all escapes from a crashing airplane, was violent. The severe vertigo was made worse by the darkness. Evans lost consciousness from the centrifugal force of the seat spinning after his egress from the crashing airplane but came back into a hazy state of alertness once his parachute canopy opened and he was scooting along under it at a steady speed with the prevailing winds. He didn’t know it, but the winds were carrying him toward the west coast of North Korea.

A disadvantage to being a stealthy aircraft is that, when the aircraft goes down, it is very difficult for rescuers to know where to look for the surviving crew, if there are any. Major Dave Evan’s ejector seat was equipped with a ProFIND SLB-2000-100 locator beacon. The beacon is a part of the pilot’s survival kit packed into the seat pan of the ACES II ejector seat. It actuates automatically when the pilot separates and dangles below him as a part of the survival kit package. At 9,500 feet above the ground Evan’s locator beacon began to transmit.

03:40 Hr.s Local. 45,000 feet AGL, U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS Aircraft, 21 miles west of North Korean coast.

Airman 1st Class Stephanie “Stuffy Stef” Monroe, an airborne sensor operator oddly prone to allergies on board an E-3 Sentry off the coast of North Korea, saw something on her monitor she had only seen in training. The flashing icon indicated an incoming emergency locator beacon from a pilot’s survival kit. She keyed her microphone to the on-board mission commander. In less than one minute half of the crew of the E-3 were shifting their workloads to a new priority; rescue one of the most sensitive assets in the U.S. military- a stealth bomber pilot.

(TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, OKLA) Airmen from the 960th Airborne Air Control Squadron monitor the skies during the E-3 Sentry 30th anniversary flight Mar. 23. The E-3 first arrived at Tinker on Mar. 23, 1977, and Airmen have been conducting the same aerial surviellance mission for the past 30 years. (Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy Fowler)

This story was originally posted at Tomdemerly.com.

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Analysis And Opinion: What Will Happen With The North Korean Crisis?

What will be the eventual outcome of the current perceived brinkmanship between the United States and North Korea?

For students of history in the region the answer is conspicuous. The outcome will rise from the historical template of national evolution in the region. This history is among the most ancient of civilized man. As a result of this deep historical context and precedent, the script is likely already written, but the acts will unfold on a new stage of hyper-fast media that can exert a dangerous influence.

To the laymen and popular media consumer there will continue to be a forward facing game of media sensationalized military brinkmanship played out above a very subtle, quiet and deliberate process of diplomacy. The likely outcome will be an asymmetrical win-win that will benefit all parties in the broad spectrum, but more so North Korea than any other party. Part of this asymmetry in benefit is earned by North Korea’s increased tolerance for risk in this era.

North Korea finally realizes a need to enter the “Functioning Core” of the world community. Unencumbered by a radical religious mantra their only divinity is servitude to state. They are long overdue from becoming a modern nation state in nearly every way.

Author and scholar Thomas P.M. Barnett broadly divided the nations and governing ideologies of the world into two categories; the “Functioning Core” and the “Non-Integrated Gap”. Barnett’s theory was presented into a now-famous Powerpoint delivered at the Pentagon called “The Pentagon’s New Map”. In his thesis Barnett describes how nations and cultures of the Non-Integrated Gap who are not perverted by ideological distortion eventually realize they could have things better; they could have easy access to clean water, they could have dependable electricity, safe and abundant food and adequate clothing and shelter. In the greater evolution they could have access to the world community via the Internet. Once that social evolution is complete the citizenry can cross borders at the speed of the Internet, unencumbered by national dogma and censorship. This is their express ticket to the world economy.

North Korea realizes the pitfalls of the Arab Spring.  They are smart enough to have learned from the Middle East, where most countries are worse off following the Arab Spring. Russia and the U.S. are mostly the only ones to benefit during the near term in the Middle East and left with the lion’s share of plunder- albeit at great cost. But the countries and people in the Arab Spring are left destitute, trapped in a vacuum that is a breeding ground for messy, infectious radicalism as difficult to kill as a stubborn mold in a dank cellar. Kim Jung Un has been quiet witness to this phenomenon, and seeks to avoid becoming the next Syria, Libya or Iraq.

There is a subtle, brutal genius to Kim Jung Un’s strategy. He has avoided coups, subverted military conflict and expertly wielded nuclear brinkmanship to his advantage. He has everything to gain, and gain he will. When this is over a year or two from now, North Korea will be substantially more integrated into the global economy. The big losers in the near term will be the North Korean people. They have been subject to poverty and oppression on a titanic scale, unprecedented almost anywhere in the world today except North Africa. Their march into the modern world, from the non-integrated gap to the Functioning Core will take a decade at least, and it will be a grinding procession lubricated by more North Korean peasant blood. But war on a pan-Pacific scale will be subverted.

In the media this evolution will look and feel like brinkmanship, but on the back channels of old-world Asian diplomacy it will be business as usual, not far removed from the age of Niccolò Polo and Maffeo Polo as chronicled by their famous son, Marco Polo.

This article was originally published at Tomdemerly.com

 

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Will The U.S. Preemptively Strike North Korea?

Media Suggests U.S. Could Strike Preemptively: But What Are The Chances?

The U.S. Military could launch precision strikes against specific North Korean targets as early as next month if North Korea continues threats of nuclear weapons and long-range missile development. Military action may be viewed as necessary by the U.S. with growing concern over North Korea’s weapons development and continued threats of using long-range missiles to strike without warning.

Reported elevated readiness of Chinese, South Korean and U.S. military assets in the region have increased tensions and speculation about the likelihood of either the U.S. or North Korea launching a preemptive strike.

What are the chances and indicators of conflict developing soon in the volatile region? What would a U.S. strike, if it came, look like?

Social media and contributory Internet press have painted a somewhat sensational, hawkish picture of tensions in the region. The weekend prior to North Korea’s massive April 15 military parade U.S. media outlet, “Superstation 95.com” erroneously reported that, “There is now a “mad dash” to leave Seoul, the Capital of South Korea.” Spurious reports of military activity in the region have been widely shared across blogs and social media.

These sensational reports reached a climax over the weekend when network media incorrectly reported the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) battle group was en route to the Korean Peninsula. It is unclear whether reports of the Carl Vinson battle group were intentionally misleading as a “feint” or if the media and U.S. government simply did a bad job coordinating press information.

Official Chinese media outlet Xinhuanet is muted in their characterization of an armed conflict being imminent, even though the BBC World News reports that, “China fears North Korea-US conflict ‘at any moment’.”

Despite sensationalized reporting, the North Korean watchdog website 38North.org suggests little remarkable activity within the key Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. This lack of activity pointed to the failed missile test Sunday in North Korea as opposed to a nuclear test near Yongbyon.

On Wednesday, April 19, Flight Service Bureau, a commercial aviation information organization, issued its strongest warning for civilian flights over North Korea, publishing a Notice to Airmen that reads, “With the increased tension on the Korean peninsula in April 2017, we raise the risk level to ‘Moderate’. Historically, the rhetoric has been predictable. That has now changed. With China off-side, and increased US appetite for action, North Korea has begun to act unpredictably.”
Flight Service Bureau’s “Moderate” risk level is their highest level, with the source confirming that, “In assessing risk to flight over each countries borders, two scenarios are predominant for civil flight: 1. Risk of shootdown, inadvertent or intentional; 2. Aircraft emergency requiring a landing. Both these elements are taken into consideration in determining a classification. The highest level of risk here is ‘Moderate’, on the basis that calling it ‘high’ or ‘severe’ would exaggerate the actual level or risk in landing or overflying the territories concerned”.

Notices to Airmen have declared North Korean airspace a “no-fly” zone for commercial operators. (Image Credit: SafeAirSpace.net e-mail bulletin)

The Chinese official airline, Air China, had already suspended flights between Beijing and Pyongyang, but the airline cited falling traffic as the reason, not diplomatic or security factors.

China halted imports of coal from North Korea to China, a potential blow to North Korea’s economy. Chinese media reports the reasons for the import halt were that the limits of Chinese mandated coal imports from North Korea, and that the reported tensions in the region are not related to the halt of coal shipments from North Korea to China.

United States popular media reports that China has moved military units close to the Chinese/North Korean border are disputed by the Chinese government. Official U.S. Pacific Command has refused to comment about any potential Chinese troop movements. China’s foreign ministry called such reports “pure fiction,” with Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying saying, “I have no idea where these reports are coming from” in remarks to the Chinese news outlet Huanqiu.com.

Any attack on North Korea by the United States within the next 60 days would likely be a measured response to nuclear or missile tests. Precision strikes likely using cruise missiles and, to a lesser degree, low observable aircraft like the B-2 Spirit, could destroy North Korean launch and test facilities specifically. Any action by the U.S. must also contain the threat of retaliation by the North Koreans on South Korea and Japan. The South Korean capital is only 35 miles, about 56 kilometers, from the North Korean border along with its 25-million person population, half of South Korea’s total population.

North Korea disclosed it has an inventory of approximately 38.5kg (84.8 pounds) of weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods in May 2008. Two years later in November 2010 they revealed a uranium enrichment program intended to produce low enriched uranium for nuclear reactor fuel to produce electricity. This fuel could be converted to weapons grade materials, although yields would be low compared to the amount of material needed for nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang has conducted five live nuclear weapons tests, one each in 2006, 2009, 2013, and increased testing to two nuclear detonations in 2016. North Korea claimed the latest January 2016 test was a powerful thermonuclear warhead but this has not been verified. It is reasonable to suggest a significant amount of their nuclear material has been expended in testing.

Earlier in August 2013 the key Yongbyon Nuclear Complex started a 5 mega-watt nuclear reactor capable of producing 6 kg. (13.2 lbs) of weapons grade plutonium per year, but the reactor’s operation has been sporadic with satellite imagery frequently showing the plume of cooling steam leaving the reactor has stopped indicating it is not operating at full capacity.

To put this level of weaponized nuclear production into perspective it takes about 198 kg (436.5 lbs) of enriched uranium-235 to produce a warhead of similar destructive force to the warheads employed by the U.S. during the operational nuclear strikes on Japan in 1945.

Given these total numbers of nuclear material production North Korea would likely have a difficult time scraping together enough nuclear material to produce a reasonable number of warheads now. This is especially important when you consider their missile doctrine includes using large numbers of poorly guided missiles as opposed to sophisticated ICBMs with accurate targeting capability. In short, even if North Korea could load a warhead onto a missile with long enough range to reach the U.S., likely Alaska or Hawaii, it is unlikely the missile could be accurately guided to key targets.

Current assessment of North Korean offensive long-range missile capabilities. (Image credit: Created by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies for the Nuclear Threat Initiative – NTI.org)

If a preemptive U.S. attack on North Korea were to happen soon the primary strategic targets would likely be attacked from U.S. ballistic missile submarines using RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM Block IVs). This first wave attack, similar to the surface attack launched against Syrian chemical weapons assets on Friday, April 7, would directly hit nuclear and missile facilities along with North Korea’s ability to strike Seoul. The initial strike would also degrade North Korea’s air defense capability and early warning assets. At close interval to the first wave of Tomahawk missiles a series of airstrikes by U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers using standoff weapons such as air-launched cruise missiles may target key North Korean facilities. Strike package planners would keep survival of the expensive and exotic B-2 bomber force as a primary concern since the U.S. has only 18 currently operational B-2 stealth bombers. Submarine launched ballistic missile strikes would be limited too, with the number of rounds fired from submarines against North Korea being controlled by how many conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles are on board for use against North Korean targets.

Tactical air assets, from both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, would be tasked with the air-policing mission should an attack happen on North Korea. These forces would contain and interdict any attack from North Korea on South Korea and provide a defensive cordon with Japan. Large numbers of North Korean long-range artillery gun tubes can fire on Seoul, so these targets would be destroyed if they began to fire on South Korea. It is unlikely U.S. Marine air assets would be tasked unless Marine Corps ground troops were employed, an unlikely outcome if the primary objective of the strike is degrading North Korean WMD development and capability.

A secondary objective to any strike on North Korea may be regime change. The rogue state has interjected political and economic uncertainty into the region since North Korea first invaded South Korea on June 25th, 1950. There has never been an official “end” to the Korean War of 1950, only an armistice signed in 1953. Tensions have remained high to extremely high for 64 years since the armistice. North Korea is a candidate for a “decapitation strike” since, unlike conflicts in the Mideast delineated by cultural and religious underpinnings, no such mass religious allegiance for North Korean leadership or culture exists outside the country. Adherence to government doctrine within the country is largely compelled by means of enforcement rather than voluntary compliance. In political and cultural terms North Korea is increasingly isolated and identified largely as a rogue state within the U.S. It’s likely very few Americans would identify with or feel empathy for North Korea if the U.S began military action against the rogue state.

A primary drawback to any regime change initiative is the potential for disastrous collateral humanitarian hardship. Any willful mission of regime change would have to include plans for humanitarian relief for the 25,378,000 people living in North Korea, many of whom live without electricity outside of the capital Pyongyang. The U.S. has not amassed any large humanitarian aid assets in the region to match its military build-up. According to a March 24, 2017 report in USA Today, “chronic food insecurity, early childhood malnutrition and nutrition insecurity continue to be widespread in the North, which ranked 98th out of 118 countries in the 2016 Global Hunger Index. More than 10 million people — or about 41 percent of the North Korean population — are undernourished.”

As many nations have learned in conflicts in Africa, a massive population of malnourished, displaced refugees can actually be a powerful weapon when expended toward neighboring nations, exacting a massive toll on infrastructure. Since North Korea shares borders with only China to the north or South Korea to the south these two countries would receive the burden of a massive refugee exodus from North Korea in the event of major conflict.

The likelihood of U.S. armed intervention in North Korea over the next 60 days may have been moderated by the recent U.S. missile strikes on Syria to destroy chemical weapons and the very large conventional aerial bomb attack in Afghanistan to destroy a cave complex. These actions send a clear message to Pyongyang: the current U.S. leadership is not afraid to use military force, even in a complex political environment such as Syria and its implications with Russian relations. As a result, North Korea may be cautious about how they proceed with provoking the United States. While North Korea may feign weapons tests they would, at this point, be unwise to provoke a U.S administration with a recently volatile record.

 

 

 

North Korea displayed their largest mobile-launch capable long-range missiles this past weekend. (RT.com)

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North Korea Nukes San Francisco In Latest Propaganda Video

This is not the first time a North Korean propaganda video shows a U.S. city exploding into balls of flames following a nuclear attack.

The following clip shows the closing seconds of a concert that was part of North Korea’s celebration of President Kim Il Sung’s 105th birthday anniversary.

You can clearly see a video screen behind the orchestra with a computer generated video that shows a handful of strategic nuclear missiles hitting San Francisco.

Although Pyongyang regularly launches short-range missiles, it is testing mid-range and long-range missiles meant to reach regional targets and, eventually, the U.S. mainland with nuclear warheads. The latest test failed shortly after the missile was launched at 5:21 p.m. Eastern U.S. time zone on Apr. 17.

North Korea is currently not believed to be able to reach targets in the Continental U.S., however, Kim Jong Un has often threatened nuking American cities (as well as a US aircraft carrier….) in the last few years.

In 2013, the “U.S. Mainland Strike Plan” exposed the targets of a North Korean ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) attack on the U.S, whereas a video released on Apr. 13, 2013, few days before the North Korea’s celebration of Kim Il Sung, showed San Diego, Washington DC, Austin and Honolulu exploding into balls of flames after a missile attack.

Few days after the video of the nuke attack on the U.S. cities was released, American artist Al Clark “responded” to the disturbing North Korean nuclear threat and propaganda videos with a provocative computer generated image showing a B-2 dropping a nuclear bomb over Pyongyang.

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Can The U.S. Actively Disrupt North Korean Missile Tests?

North Korean Missile Test Failure Raises Theories, But Expert Disagrees.

The recent failure of the Sunday, April 17 North Korean submarine launched ballistic missile test raises an interesting question: Could the United States be responsible for the failure of North Korean missile tests? While the theory is alluring and some political sources are quoted as it being possible, one noted expert says he has seen nothing to suggest the U.S. intervened in the North Korean test failure.

Reports from the US Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith in Aiea, Hawaii under Chief of Staff Major General Kevin B. Schneider, USAF, say the U.S. detected a North Korean missile launch at 5:21 p.m. Eastern U.S. time zone on Saturday. The launches were seen at 11:21 AM Hawaiian time (21:21 GMT) said US Navy Commander Dave Benham, spokesman for United States Pacific Command.

Surveillance indicated the missile failed almost immediately.

A similar North Korean missile test was conducted earlier on April 5, 2017 and also failed along with another Mar. 5 North Korean missile test failure. All of the missiles encountered terminal problems in flight. These conspicuous failures follow a powerful U.S. initiative to develop clandestine anti-missile capabilities under the Obama administration beginning in 2014.

While there is no published evidence to support the theory that the United States directly interfered with the North Korean missile test, network media including CNN and the BBC have published speculative reports about whether the capability to remotely interdict a missile launch exists and was used.

“There is a very strong belief that the US, through cyber methods, has been successful on several occasions in interrupting these sorts of tests and making them fail,” former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind told the BBC World News.

The Aviationist.com spoke to Dr. Bruce Emerson Bechtol Jr., Professor at the Department of Security Studies at Angelo State University, San Angelo, Texas in the United States.

In addition to his Ph.D. in National Security Studies from The Union Institute in Cincinnati, Ohio Dr. Bechtol was the Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College where he earned his pre-doctorate Masters Degree in Military Studies in 2001. Bechtol also owns a Master of Arts in International Affairs from Catholic University in Washington D.C. He is a noted authority on North Korean military capabilities. We asked Dr. Bechtol about the possibilities that the U.S. could have actively disrupted North Korean missile tests.

“There is nothing to support that.” Dr. Bechtol told us when we asked him about the plausibility of direct U.S. interdiction of the North Korean missile test. “I mean, it is certainly possible, but I have seen nothing to support that. All I have heard is conjecture. The media likes to talk about that.”

Noted expert on North Korean defense technology and doctrine Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (credit: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)

Dr. Bechtel told us that ballistic missile programs are inherently dependent on numbers. “It’s like the SCUD missile. Typically, of 600 of those fired, you get 150-200 duds. That’s normal, but the intention is to shower a target with missiles. And remember, if you are attacking Hawaii with a nuclear warhead, you don’t have to be that accurate, you just have to get one through.”

Another change in newer North Korean missiles noted by Dr. Bechtel was newer guidance fins. When asked what the guidance capabilities of the North Korean’s ballistic missiles are, Bechtel told us, “Well, I wish we knew. But one thing is for sure; the North Koreans are not noted for accuracy in their ballistic missiles. They don’t have to be.”

The failure may also have been a part of a historically difficult development program for North Korea’s missiles. But just as North Korea has had somewhat sporadic successes in their missile launch tests, the U.S. has also had at least sporadic success in testing systems to actively counter ballistic missiles. Even with Dr. Bechtel’s pragmatism there remains a remote chance that Sunday’s failure could have been a fortunate intersection of capabilities for the U.S. It also may have been continued North Korean bad luck. Among U.S. defense officials, the silence is deafening.

While Dr. Bechtel’s remarks suggest otherwise, a North Korean submarine launched missile test could theoretically be disrupted several ways. “I guess, you mean, something like Stuxnet is theoretically possible, but I haven’t seen any proof.” Stuxnet was a 2010 computer worm that disrupted Iran’s nuclear program. It is attributed to American-Israeli origin.

The least exotic method of passive missile interdiction is sabotage. This could occur at the missile assembly site or during transport of the missile or its components. Since North Korean missile programs are dependent on foreign technology they are highly vulnerable to sabotage throughout their development.

Current North Korean missile technology is derived from a combination of Chinese, Russian and Iranian technologies. Each of these foreign technology origins is “porous” to foreign espionage not only from the United States but also from Israel and the United Kingdom. It took China about 15 years to achieve its current level of development in ballistic missiles. North Korea has achieved a similar level of technology in only 123 days of advanced development, reinforcing the theory that most of the technology is imported, not indigenous. Given a seemingly new era of détente between the U.S. and China, including recent meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, it is possible that a two-way sharing of technology between the U.S. and China has been brokered. This may further facilitate U.S. efforts to sabotage North Korean missile capabilities.

Interestingly, an Iranian ballistic missile test on Jan. 25, 2017 also failed shortly after launch. According to a US official speaking on condition of anonymity, the Iranian medium-range ballistic missile exploded in flight. But Dr. Bechtel continued to temper speculation with fact, “There were four SCUDs recently tested by North Korea that were successful. These recent failures don’t’ lesson the threat.”

The failed North Korean missile test on Sunday was possibly a version of the Pukguksong-1 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This missile is boosted to the ocean surface from a submerged launch platform using either compressed air or a booster motor. Once it clears the surface the missile’s solid fuel motor ignites and it begins its flight.

North Korea has launched SLBM’s from both submerged test barges and from submarines. Part of the reason some tests were conducted from submerged barges is that launching missiles from a submerged vehicle is inherently dangerous. Reports indicate at least one North Korean submarine was seriously damaged during a missile launch test, suggesting a reason for why early tests were launched from a submerged barge instead of a submarine.

North Korea displayed new versions of the Pukguksong-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles this week but their most recent test launched failed. (credit: Official North Korean News Agency)

A more exotic theory about how the U.S. could disrupt a North Korean ballistic missile in flight is some type of active intervention during the test, as opposed to sabotage prior to the test.

Active interdiction of missile tests may include somewhat plausible methods such as electronic disruption of the missile’s guidance systems causing it to fly out of control and disintegrate, or more exotically, some type of focused energy weapon. Both of these technologies have been tested to greater and lesser degrees of published success. A key thing to consider when evaluating any of these theories is that advanced active jamming and destructive methods remain most effective when they are still secret. As long as these technologies remain covert it is more difficult- or impossible- for North Korea to engineer around them.

Some media outlets have suggested that North Korean systems are vulnerable to “hacking” or a cyber attack. While possible, cyber attacks depend on a “delivery vehicle” to implant malicious programming code into microchips or insertion via a virus. The Stuxnet weaponized code was inserted via a USB flashdrive.

China has devoted significant military and intelligence resources to cyber warfare but has little motive to employ those resources against neighboring North Korea- except to build leverage with the United States.

The U.S. also has highly developed cyber combat resources in addition to the early Stuxnet. These may include what is referred to as “left of launch” attacks. Some of these may even be interdiction of a ballistic missile while it is still underwater. One published technical report about electromagnetic propagation mentions the “Wireless, through-hull transfer of power and data”. This transfer is “highly focused” and ranges in excess of 1 km are discussed in unclassified reports dating as long ago as 2008 from submarine industry news source Hydro International. It is reasonable to suggest significant advances have been made in all of these technologies during the past 9 years, especially given the focus during the previous U.S. President’s adminstration.

Regardless of theories about possible test interdiction from the U.S., the North Korean weapons tests and their accelerated preparation have become increasingly ominous. Both media and political rhetoric has shifted from “if” there will be a military confrontation with North Korea, to “when” it will actually begin.

Top image: (computer generated) image of a North Korean SLBM (Rodong Sinmun via NK News)