China’s J-10C Allegedly Seen Carrying YJ-21E Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile for the First Time

Published on: December 27, 2025 at 2:32 PM
The image showing what appears to be the YJ-21E being carried on the J-10C’s left wing. (Image credit: Chinese internet via ‘Hurin’ on X)

The YJ-21E spotted on the J-10C is a smaller variant of the larger YJ-21/KD-21 predominantly spotted on the H-6K bomber, specifically designed for fighter jets and drones.

China’s J-10C fighter has emerged in a recent photograph with what observers have identified as the ‘E’ variant of the YJ-21 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (AShBM), the YJ-21E. Describing it a “smaller” variant of the YJ-21 that has been previously been carried by the PLA Air Force’s H-6K bombers, ‘Hurin’, a leading profile analyzing Chinese aerospace and military equipment, also shared an image of a mock-up display of the YJ-21E from an exhibition.

It must be noted that given the multirole nature of the J-10C, the aircraft could have been integrated with the air-to-surface missile for some time (and even live-fired it), with this being only the first time it has been photographed. The J-10C can be considered in the same class of the U.S.-made F-16, which is the launching platform for heavy-hitting surface-strike munitions like the AGM-158 JASSM-ER and the Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW), but also capable of employing anti-ship missiles.

The YJ-21 also goes by other designations accorded by various quarters. In fact, it has been identified as the KD-21 by other Chinese military analysts like Andreas Rupprecht, and 2PZD-21 by the Chinese military itself, with the corresponding markings spotted on the missile being carried under the H-6K since 2022 in unofficial pictures.

The YJ-21 designation had been mentioned by Chinese state outlets like Global Times, which itself attributes the origin of this nomenclature to “foreign media.” This was then confirmed to be the final, official designation during the Sep. 3 parade, where truck-mounted models of the missiles with the YJ-21 marking rolled down as a part of that contingent.

The YJ-21 mounted on trucks, possibly a mock-up, rolling down the Sep. 3 military parade in Beijing. (Image credit: Sina Weibo/Telegram)

The KD-21 ALBM

We have reported about the KD-21 in the past, when it was displayed as a part of the payload of a CH-series Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) in October 2024. Prior to that, in July of the same year, we reported about an H-6K being photographed carrying four of the missiles, two and a half months after a PLAAF H-6K was captured dropping the KD-21 in official footage.

The Aviationist has also reported about other massive Chinese Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBM) like the CH-AS-X-13. Other observers had pointed out this is unlikely to be just an extended KD-21, given the significant differences in the nose cone and the length, although it is not possible to discern how the KD-21/2PZD-21/YJ-21/YJ-21E and the CH-AS-X-13 are related.

J-20 and the YJ-21E

The J-10C in the newly surfaced image is carrying the YJ-21E on its port (left-side) wing while being photographed from the right side. Only some parts of the weapon are visible, including the tip and a significant part of the lower half.

We can see a dual red and yellow-coloured band near the tip. The KD-21 shown in front of the CH-series UCAV as a part of its representative payload has a red-colored band instead.

In an earlier picture from November 2022, the 2PZD-21 (the designation stenciled on the missile’s body) under the H-6K had a yellow band along a part of its length. However, Global Times reported in July 2024, when the H-6K carried four of the missiles, that the November 2022 reveal during the Zhuhai Air Show as a static display was the weapon’s debut. On that occasion, the missile sported a sealed exhaust, as common with inert weapons.

Generally, going by standard international military practices, blue bands represent inert/training munitions, while yellow ones indicate live munitions. It is unclear whether China similarly uses red and yellow to denote live status.

An Apr. 1, 2025 image also showed an H-6K bomber carrying two KD-21 ALBMs, which observers claimed was during the “Strait Thunder-2025A” exercise held by the ETC (Eastern Theater Command) around Taiwan. These did not have any colored markings, but rather a white-colored tip.

Rupprecht and other observers at the time believed the KD-21 had been already operational, as the H-6K carrying it belonged to an operational unit – the 10th Bomber Division. Given that, in the latest image of the KD-21 under the J-10C, we cannot see the missile fully, especially its rear exhaust and control fins, it is difficult to analyze the overall dimensions of the weapon and the differences from the larger KD-21.

The J-10C here is also not carrying any other munitions, except for three external fuel tanks. Markings on the aircraft and the tail that indicate the serial number and its unit are also absent, although this is possibly deliberate for Operational Security (OPSEC) purposes.

Conclusion

What can be said for certain is that the trend of deriving certain ALBMs from a larger missile is now common practice.

This can be seen in the relationship between the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic hypersonic missile and the ground-launched 9K720 Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that the Kinzhal “is likely derived” from the Iskander-M.

This means the Kinzhal could just be an Iskander-M without its booster stage, used when the weapon is launched from the road-mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). To launch the missile from the air, it is likely the carrier MiG-31K has to attain the particular speed and altitude similar to the ones achieved by the Iskander’s booster, before the jet’s pilot begins the launch sequence.

The purpose of the reasoning is to highlight that certain weapons development trends across countries are universal. Even if the KD-21/2PZD-21/YJ-21 and the CH-AS-X-13 were unrelated, their strikingly similar shapes show how developing a missile based on an existing one is a simpler proposition.

The CH-AS-X-13 will drop from the slow-flying H-6K before the booster ignites and the missile goes near vertical, in a ballistic or quasi-ballistic trajectory, before shedding its stages to release the final stage’s ‘kill vehicle.’ A fast-flying J-10, given its own organic high-speed, can release the KD-21/YJ-21/2PZD-21 at the required kinematics. This will dive down at what GT says would be hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 and above) on aircraft carriers.

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Parth Satam's career spans a decade and a half between two dailies and two defense publications. He believes war, as a human activity, has causes and results that go far beyond which missile and jet flies the fastest. He therefore loves analyzing military affairs at their intersection with foreign policy, economics, technology, society and history. The body of his work spans the entire breadth from defense aerospace, tactics, military doctrine and theory, personnel issues, West Asian, Eurasian affairs, the energy sector and Space.
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