Tag Archives: China

Chinese fighters tail U.S. aircraft in disputed airspace

The Want China Times has quoted the Tokyo’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper as saying that Chinese J-7 and J-10 fighters tailed two US aircraft as they reached the airspace close to the border between China and Japan.

The two U.S. aircraft allegedly shadowed by the People’s Loberation Army Air Force were a U.S. Navy P-3C from Misawa and a U.S. Air Force C-130 from Yokota airbase.  According to the Japanese media outlets, the Chinese fighter jets were scrambled to intercept them.

J-10

Image credit: Wiki/Retxham

This incident took place on January 10, the same day when a  Japanese reconnaissance aircraft attached to Japan’s Maritime Self-defence Force were dispatched to monitor Chinese aircraft movements near to the disputed Diaoyutai islands (Senkaku in Japan).

The following day Japanese F-15J Eagle interceptors tailed two Chinese J-10s that were launched to observe Japanese aircraft movements close to the border.

Even if it would appear that both sides are only conducting routine patrols in the area, there is a concrete risk that such close encounters turn into something more serious, escalating tensions into a conflict.

On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3E SIGINT plane was intercepted by a PLA Navy J-8 of the island of Hainan. The two planes went a bit too close each other and collided mid-air.

The collision, caused the death of the Chinese fighter pilot, whereas the American spyplane was forced to perform an emergency landing on Hainan.

The 24 crew members were detained and interrogated by the Chinese authorities until being released on April 21, 2001.

Written with Richard Clements

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Why China’s Tu-22 bombers would represent a serious threat to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers

As already happened in the past for other posts published on this blog, one the most interesting comment to The Aviationist’s recent article on China’s alleged purchase of the entire Tu-22 production line from Russia, has come from Aviationintel.com‘s Tyler Rogoway.

Tyler has analyzed the controversial news for his excellent site and given his permission to share his perspective here for The Aviationist’s readers.

Why China’s Tu-22 bombers would represent a serious threat to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers

If, and I stress the if, this report [about the Tu-22 production line sale] proves true then China has just made yet another massive commitment toward its strategy of area denial vis-a-vis the US Navy and other smaller naval players in the region.

Some would think that China buying a relic like the Tu-22 does not represent much of a threat, especially when compared with modern low observable bombers and UAVs currently serving, or being tested, in the US. I disagree with this stance entirely.

The Backfire is a fantastically potent long-range anti-ship weapons platform that can also carry around plenty of other gear to do other missions, such as standoff or escort jamming, network relay, and long range radar targeting to name a few. When paired with the modern version of the KH-22/32, or similar indigenously developed supersonic anti-ship missile, with over a 300 mile range, the great utility of the Tu-22 to the Chinese Military is clear.

The Backfire will add a much-needed anti-access layer of defense against US Naval Carrier Strike Groups operating in the region.

China seeks to create a 1,000 mile buffer around its shores that will by and large keep American fighter aircraft and cruise missiles outside of striking range against strategic targets located on their mainland.

The Tu-22M, loaded with two to three KH-32 (or similar) anti-shipping missiles, has a true combat radius of about 1,500 miles. The anti-ship missiles themselves have a range of around 300 miles for supersonic anti-ship variants and up to 1,500 miles for subsonic anti-ship cruise missile variants. For this piece we will only talk about the shorter ranged supersonic anti-ship missiles as they pose a much greater threat to American naval flotillas than the lumbering long range subsonic variety.

Also, targeting becomes an issue with such a long range and slow flying missile capability.

The pairing of the Tu-22M and a KH-32 type of missile gives China a relevant and well established area denial buffer of about 1,900 miles. Thus putting US Carrier Strike Groups outside of their offensive striking distance by a factor of two for their Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and over a factor of three for the F/A-18E/F and F-35C fleet.

So when it comes to inter-atmospheric anti-ship missile delivery, China has chosen a credible and commercially available weapons platform, and potentially its already integrated and developed weaponry, to get the job done. Furthermore, the swing-wing giant has considerable room for growth and weight reduction as it was built using 1970′s avionics and construction techniques. If modernized in terms of both its cockpit interface and sensors, as well as its propulsion and structures, the Tu-22 would remain as one of the best maritime standoff weapon systems in the world for the foreseeable future, a purpose configured aircraft focused on regional deterrence instead of offensive long-range strike.

Additionally the Tu-22 Backfire is fast, very fast (tops out at about M1.9 but can reach lower +1 mach numbers with ease). This means that once it launches its suicidal payload it can run like hell to avoid counter attack.

This is a big deal, as currently China’s archaic long range anti-shipping platforms are not high performance in nature, although they do possess superior range when compared with the Backfire (see Xian H-6).

All this comes down to a layered strategy of area denial being carefully constructed by the Chinese. There has been a ton of talk about their shadowy DF-21D “anti-ship ballistic missile” program over the last few years, a weapon system that China has already questionably declared operational. Still, I have heard no definitive information as to how accurate or even capable this system is at this stage of its development and clearly China lacks certain components which are very important in making the DF-21D an effective military capability (more on this later).

Regardless, America should not discount the ballistic anti-ship missile concept or its potential effectiveness. Even if it has a 15% success rate, this simply means that China will barrage our flotillas with a salvo of these carrier killers in an attempt to score a successful hit. The necessity of salvo attacks actually compounds the US Navy’s force protection and air defense problems as dealing with saturation attacks is still not their strong suit.

So does China’s claimed acquisition of a costly long-range, supersonic, air-breathing anti-ship missile delivery system with a lot of room for growth signal that their shadowy DF-21D program is still more of a dream than it is a reality?

Possibly, but I would rather classify China’s choice to procure the Tu-22M as one of common sense strategy and economic opportunity than a move to temporarily fulfill an unplanned strategic deficiency.

Adding a potent layer of area denial capability via the Tu-22 gives China redundancy when it comes to their naval anti-access strategy and clearly makes their potential naval foes in the region much more vulnerable to successful attack. To my knowledge, as it sits now, AEGIS ballistic missile defense ships cannot look for air-breathing and exo-atmospheric threats at the same time. This problem is solved by deploying to troubled regions with multiple AEGIS platforms that can split the duty up during high-risk phases of their mission. Still, this fact highlights the reality that a coordinated strike emanating from the air, inner space, and potentially underwater at a single time can cripple a Carrier Strike Group, especially if such an attack was made with large quantities of munitions.

All it takes is one “expendable” to hit its target to potentially leave a Carrier Strike Group without its primary offensive punch, the aircraft on the deck of the aircraft carrier that serves as its centerpiece. Additionally, an area denial / anti access (AD/A2) strategy is more about deterrence than anything else, so providing another clear reason not to sail within striking range of China’s shores during a time of peer state conflict undeniably strengthens China’s ability to deter such an incursion in the first place.

On the economic side of the equation, the Tu-22 has not been in production for over a decade and Russia will continue to draw down its aging air forces in exchange for modernization of remaining “legacy” platforms and for replacement of them by newer generation combat aircraft now coming online. In other words, metaphorically speaking, China bought an inventory and a factory that makes something nobody wants anymore.

Meanwhile, Russia is all about aggressive military exports and the peddling of its Cold War surplus inventory in exchange for fresh cash infusions whenever and wherever possible. So, in the case of the TU-22 the price was most likely very right and the requirement is clearly very real. In other words, the old adage “some deals just make themselves” is alive and well in the world of weapons exportation and proliferation, “one nation’s junk is another nation’s treasure” and so on…

We all know that China loves to reverse engineer pretty much anything they can get their hands on. Don’t hate the player, hate the game I guess. None-the-less, seeing as they are already building their own SU-27 derivatives, one of which is carrier capable, what is not to say that the technology gained by basically taking over the defunct Backfire program is not valuable to them in ways that are not totally clear to us at this time?

As I discussed earlier, if China develops the Tu-22 with new avionics, motors, subsystems and structures, they will have an incredibly powerful asset that can be used for many things, even as an air to air arsenal ship for ultra long-range air to air missiles, or as a heavy-duty jamming platform that can keep up with a formation of fighters for medium-range strike and counter air duties.

In essence, what China is getting buy purchasing not just a few dozen Tu-22s but the actual means of production and intellectual property related to the aircraft is a high performance asset that is uniquely suited for their geography and strategy, as well as technology transfer that can  one day lead to the indigenous development of a much more advanced long range strike platform.

China has followed with a laser like focus the crawl-walk-run strategy when it comes to rapidly developing their indigenous aerospace and defense manufacturing capabilities, and the “crawling” and “walking” have mainly been done in “other nations shoes,” or in this case via technology transfer from the importation and eventual licensing of foreign high-end combat aircraft. This strategy has worked on a mind numbingly successful level, as China has gone from manufacturing MiG-21 derivatives to viable stealth fighters in a matter of a decade or so, so why would they depart from this proven model now when it comes to long range strike?

Like almost everything else AD/A2 related it all comes down to targeting. The ocean is a big, big place. Finding even a large US flotilla in it is like looking for a single human hair in a swimming pool. In order for the Backfire to accomplish its mission it needs to know where to go to attack, or even generally where to patrol in an attempt to search for targets. Currently, China’s DF-21D ballistic anti-ship missile system relies on over the horizon radar for targeting, whose accuracy and fidelity is questionable at best.

Additionally, these large fixed radar sites will be the first thing struck, even at great costs, in a war between China and the US. So, it primarily comes down to long endurance aircraft, ideally unmanned and low observable in nature, to provide key targeting info to any long-range maritime strike capability.

This is an area where China has lagged far behind the US, at least until we lost a RQ-170 Sentinel, in almost totally intact form, over Iran a year ago [please read this popular Aviationintel exclusive on this topic: http://aviationintel.com/2012/01/26/chinas-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-the-lost-rq-170-sentinel/], you may finish reading it with a totally new perspective on the “Sentinel Down” incident and its long-term repercussions).

In some ways, investing into a high-performance anti-ship strike force supports my theory that China’s number one technology of urgent need is wide area maritime surveillance of an unmanned variety, especially the type that has low potential for detection when it comes to its radar cross-section and electromagnetic emissions signature (low probability of intercept data-links and radar). America’s lost RQ-170 most likely gave China a large portion of the puzzle pieces they have desperately needed to begin developing such an enabling surveillance platform, and now they can prepare to capitalize on their dawning maritime targeting capability by supporting it with potent offensive weaponry like the Tu-22.

The Chinese Tu-22 story just further makes the case against America’s losing strategy of putting massive amounts of resources into short ranged low observable manned fighter aircraft.

We desperately need medium and long-range low observable strike platforms, preferably unmanned for the medium range force [please read this in depth Aviationintel analysis on the chronic need for a low observable long range weapons and sensor truck].

Additionally, we need to further invest into building up massive stocks of survivable standoff weaponry to be used in conjunction with these platforms as well as to give lower cost and highly reliable “legacy” platforms survivability during future wars. The pairing of standoff munitions with low observable long-range combat aircraft, especially ones with human beings at the controls, makes sense as risking these assets via flying directly into an enemy’s air defense umbrella during the opening stages of a campaign is lunacy.

As key integrated air defense components are destroyed using standoff weapons and low observable delivery platforms, these high value assets can push ever further into the enemy’s territory with a much better chances of survival than attacking directly at the beginning of hostilities while the enemy’s integrated air defense system is fully intact.

Once manned low observable aircraft can operate over the battlefield directly, affordable legacy platforms that possess shorter range, and rely on close proximity to vulnerable tanker aircraft, can begin hauling standoff weaponry to the edge of the enemy’s remaining air defense capabilities in an economical fashion. In the end, standoff weapons lowers the risk of losing near priceless long-range first day of war assets during the opening days of a conflict and keeps older and/or less expensive platforms relevant throughout the campaign.

The problem is that these advanced standoff munitions are not cheap, but they are much cheaper comparatively than procuring an all “first day of war” fighter force that does not even possess the range to strike an enemy using advanced AD/A2 tactics even when paired with such standoff weaponry. In many ways, when it comes to the modern era of air combat, the munitions make the mission, not their launch platform. There is only so much money to go around, so let’s invest heavier in standoff weaponry and a flexible “high-low” force structure instead of a one-size-fits all manned fighter jet with short range and a huge price tag.

What I am getting at here is that the F-35, especially the A and C models (at least the B model gives the USA 10 more “first day of war aircraft” carriers and can operate from dispersed staging areas), are a massive waste of money when it comes to our future strategic focus, that focus being China and the Pacific Theater.

The F-35 is wasteful jobs and export program dreamed up by fighter pilots with stars on their collars and ignorant politicians who hold the purse strings. It has little applicable utility to any of the wars we are fighting in today, or the ones we are likely to fight tomorrow.

For those of you who think this is a big leap from the Tu-22 narrative and that I have turned this somehow into a hit piece on the F-35, you are both wrong and right. You are wrong when it comes to discounting the validity of bringing up the F-35 “question” in relation to China’s supposed Tu-22 developments, and yes this is piece is now partially an F-35 hit job, and deservingly so.

Take the issue at hand, China deploying an upgraded version of the TU-22 Backfire, seeing as it can launch its deadliest payload some 300+ miles from the Carrier Strike Group it is targeting, and seeing as China would most likely stage such an attack using multiple aircraft pushing towards their launch points from different vectors, the F-35C does not have enough gas to maintain vigilance at that range from the carrier for a useful amount of time, thus the F-35C making it to these multiple event horizons and engaging the backfires with much likelihood of success a questionable proposition.

Now take a quartet of UCAVs, loaded with medium/long-range air to air missiles and low probability of intercept AESA radars. The UCAVs can individually loiter for hours in the “four corners” surrounding their Carrier Strike Group, at ranges in excess of 1000 miles, without being detected.

Now you have a way to neutralize the Tu-22 threat as whole, all in a cost-effective manner. Newsflash!: you do not need a 7.5G fighter jet to swat down a massive anti-ship missile toting bomber with a radar cross-section of a five-story building. To deny such a weapons platform the ability to launch of their targets you need persistence and range, neither of which the F-35 possesses.

In many ways, carrier based unmanned combat aircraft technology can work as its own area denial / anti-access weapon system via extended the view of the carrier group and encasing it in a protective screen that is sanitized from incoming threats.

For those threats that may leak through the outer omnipresent UCAV screen, traditional Super Hornets would be just as capable as the F-35 at defending the Carrier Strike Group’s “inner sanctum,” along with AEGIS cruisers and destroyers, as well as the Carrier’s own close in weapons systems and evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. It is all about reaching out as far as possible and denying an anti-ship missile toting aircraft like the Tu-22 the ability to launch, this is accomplished through range and presence, not high performance.

In the end, by the Navy focusing its dollars and developmental capacity on the F-35C they are choosing to leave our carrier groups more vulnerable than the high/low  manned/unmanned alternative (Super Hornets and UCAVs), one that also represents the future of combat aviation (make sure to read my popular piece “Tyler’s 10 Thoughts On The Future Of Drone Warfare).

Furthermore, because the Navy continues with the F-35C program instead of more aggressively developing and procuring UCAVs they choose to limit our carrier’s direct striking distance to about 500 miles instead of over 1000 (unrefueled), all at greater human and thus political risk. In other words, the F-35C, and A for that matter, are a gift to the Chinese as it further enhances their AD/A2 fortress while sucking up funds that could be applied to more relevant longer range manned and unmanned low observable platforms and associated standoff weaponry.

The Chinese TU-22 story, if indeed true, is just another indication that we are choosing through misappropriation of resources to create a situation in the Pacific Theater where we are less capable of dealing a potential Chinese foe significant blows in light of their blooming AD/A2 strategy.

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The Aviationist’s Top 5 stories of 2012

Here below you will find the Top 5 blog posts of year 2012.

Actually, these are not the five articles that got most pageviews: in fact, among the most read ones, I’ve picked those that might be used to characterize the year and ordered them chronologically so as to give readers the opportunity to virtually review the year that is coming to an end based on what was posted by The Aviationist.

Unfortunately a lot of topics that were covered in 2012 don’t appear in this selection including Syria uprising, Israel offensive in Gaza, Korean peninsula crisis, Turkish Air Force Phantom shot down in Syria, nEUROn, Iranian UAVs, X-47B and other U.S. drones. Use the search feature or select the proper category/tag to read all what was written throughout the year.

1) Exclusive: What nobody else will tell you about the U.S. F-22 stealth fighters deployed near Iran

Posted on Apr. 30

The news that multiple F-22 stealth fighters were deployed “near Iran” has already been reported by the most important media outlets all around the world.

However, nobody has been able to provide some important details that could be useful to better understand the scope of this overseas deployment: when did the Raptors deploy? How many aircraft were deployed? Where?

And, above all, are those plane capable to perform strike missions in addition to the standard air-to-air sorties?

Thanks to the information provided by several sources, The Aviationist is able to fill the gaps, provide a more accurate view of the deployment and debunk some myths that fueled the media hype.

The six F-22 Raptors currently at Al Dhafra, UAE, belong to the 49th Fighter Wing, based at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. They flew as “Mazda 91” to Moron, Spain, on Apr. 17 and departed again for their final destination on Apr. 20.

Since they spent some 4 days in Spain, during their stay, the stealthy planes were photographed by several local spotters that were able to provide the exact list of all the examples involved in the deployment:

#04-4078, #04-4081, #05-4093, #05-4094, #05-4098, #05-4099.

If they were not willing to let the world know of such deployment they would not make a stopover in Spain, during daylight.

They are all Block 3.0 (or Block 30) examples meaning that neither of them has received the latest upgrade (Block 3.1) that has brought the capability to find and engage ground targets using the Synthetic Aperture Radar mapping and eight GBU-39 SDBs (Small Diameter Bombs) to the troubled stealthy fighter.

Therefore they are hardly involved in any build-up process in the region, since their role in case of war on Iran would be limited to the air-to-air arena: mainly fighter sweep (missions with the aim to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft prior to the arrival of the strike package), HVAA (High Value Air Asset) escort and DCA (Defensive Counter Air).

Image credit: U.S. Air Force

Considered the limited effectiveness of the Iranian Air Force, it is much more likely that the F-22s involved in any kind of attack on Iran would be those of the 3rd Fighter Wing, based at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, in Alaska, that was the first U.S. Air Force unit to receive the Block 3.1 planes and has already started training in the air-to-surface role.

Furthermore, the deployment is among those scheduled several month in advance and this is not the first time the F-22 deploys in the United Arab Emirates. In November 2009, some 1st Fighter Wing’s Raptors from Langley AFB, flew to Al Dhafra, to train with the French Air Force Rafales and the RAF Typhoons during exercise ATLC 2009. The episode is quite famous because in late December of the same year the French Ministry of Defense released the captures taken by the Rafale’s OSF (Optronique Secteur Frontal) showing an F-22 in aerial combat. In fact, although the U.S. Air Force pilots told that their plane was undefeated during the exercise, the French were killed once in six 1 vs 1 WVR (Within Visual Range) engagements versus the F-22 (the other 5 ended with a “draw”) and one Raptor was claimed as killed by a UAE Mirage 2000 during a mock engagement.

Here’s the famous capture released at the time and published for the first time by Air & Cosmos magazine.

Image credit: French MoD via Air & Cosmos

2) The mysterious U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle detachment in Djibouti. Are they conducting covert air strikes in Yemen?

Posted on May 11

Although their presence over there is not a secret (since it was announced about 10 years ago and you can see some by simply pointing Google Earth on Djibouti International Airport, as done in this interesting OSGEOINT analysis) what’s still unclear is what eight U.S. F-15Es are currently doing in the Horn of Africa.

They are reportedly serving in support of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, as an Expeditionary Squadron of the 380th Expeditionary Operations Group, based at Al Dhafra, in the United Arab Emirates, and responsible for the “war on terror” in the region, but what’s their actual mission remains a (sort-of) mystery.

Little information can be found on official sources: among the press releases of the Task Force you will only find a news about the change of command that took place on May 6. It confirms what we already know: previous detachment was provided by the U.S. Air Force in Europe’s 48th Fighter Wing through the 492nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, from RAF Lakenheath in the UK, and the new one, the 336th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, is provided by the 4th FW from Seymour Jonhnson AFB, NC.

By the way, the Strike Eagles recently spotted at Moron airbase, Spain, were on their ferry flight to Camp Lemonnier and not to Afghanistan (as initially believed).

Image credit: Air Force

Even if the American military presence across the world is usually very well advertised, the U.S. keep a low profile on the operations launched by the Air Force’s Strike Eagles from Eastern Africa.

The reason for such prudence maybe that, along with the Reaper drones, even the F-15Es are conducting air strikes in Yemen (and Somalia).

Indeed, counter terrorism operations with attacks aimed at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, including drone strikes but also naval bombardments, cruise missiles and air strikes, have increased a lot in the last years: the most recent air strikes brought the 2012 total to more than 15, about as many in the previous 10 years combined.

Some of the air strikes in Yemen were reportedly launched with the support of warplanes believed to be Yemeni Air Force ones. But there are also chances that U.S. conventional planes have been involved in air-to-surface operations officially or unofficially credited to the Yemeni government.

As happened on Mar. 11, 2012, when local residents reported that planes bombarded the town and a senior Yemeni official confirmed the U.S. inolvement by saying that “The U.S. did not inform us on the attacks. We only knew about this after the U.S. attacked” to the CNN; or on Mar. 18, when an air strike was claimed by the Yemeni government, even if the local Air Force was unable to launch an aerial bombardment as most of its personnel was on strike.

Air strikes with conventional planes are considered less respectful of the local nation’s sovereignity than drones’ attacks and this could be the reason for keeping the eventual F-15E involvement in the area a bit confidential.

Robots can silently fly for several hours and use their few missiles/bombs when needed. That’s why drones are the weapon of choice to fight Qaeda in Yemen.

However, when you need to quickly reach a distant target and hit it with a considerable payload, you might find a Strike Eagle a better platform to undertake the task.

H/T to Guido Olimpio for providing some of the links you can find in the article.

3) Farnborough 2012: “Yesterday we had Raptor salad for lunch” Typhoon pilot said after dogfighting with the F-22 at Red Flag Alaska

Posted on Jul. 13

Although a Royal Air Force Typhoon took part to the daily air display, the most interesting thing at Farnborough International Airshow 2012 was the opportunity to get some more details about the recent participation of the German Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons to the Red Flag.

In fact the last Red Flag-Alaska saw the first attendance by both the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptors and German Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons.

As we have already reported, the Typhoons and the Raptor had the opportunity engage each other in dissimilar air combat training but only a part of the story about the outcome of the mock engagements has been reported so far: the one about the German commander saying that the F-22’s capabilities are “overwhelming,” a statement that, according to Eurofighter sources, was taken out of context.

Indeed, Typhoon pilots at Farnborough said that, when flying without their external fuel tanks, in the WVR (Within Visual Range) arena, the Eurofighter not only held its own, but proved to be better than the Raptor.

Indeed, it looks like the F-22 tends to lose too much energy when using thrust vectoring (TV): TV can be useful to enable a rapid direction change without losing sight of the adversary but, unless the Raptor can manage to immediately get in the proper position to score a kill, the energy it loses makes the then slow moving stealth combat plane quite vulnerable.

This would be coherent by analysis made in the past according to which the TV it’s not worth the energy cost unless the fighter is in the post stall regime, especially in the era of High Off Bore Sight and Helmet Mounted Display (features that the F-22 lacks).

Obviously, U.S. fighter pilots could argue that, flying a stealthy plane they will never need to engage an enemy in WVR dogfight, proving that, as already explained several times, kills and HUD captures scored during air combat training are not particularly interesting unless the actual Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and the training scenario are known.

However, not all the modern and future scenarios envisage BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements and the risk of coming to close range 1 vs 1 (or 2 vs 2, 3 vs 3 etc) is still high, especially considered that the F-22 currently uses AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, whose maximum range is around 100 km (below the Meteor missile used by the Typhoon).

Moreover, at a distance of about 50 km the Typhoon IRST (Infra-Red Search and Track) system is capable to find even a stealthy plane “especially if it is large and hot, like the F-22” a Eurofighter pilot said.

Anyway, the Typhoons scored several Raptor kills during the Red Flag Alaska. On one day a German pilot, recounting a succesfull mission ironically commented: “yesterday, we have had a Raptor salad for lunch.”

Above images (credit: The Aviationist’s photographer Giovanni Maduli) show the Typhoon at Farnborough International Airshow 2012.

[Read also the follow up post: F-22 Raptor kill markings shown off by German Eurofighter Typhoons. “The F-22 is not invincible” saga continues.]

4) Marine Attack Squadron loses eight Harrier jets in worst U.S. air loss in one day since the Vietnam War

Posted on Sept. 16

On Friday Sept. 14, at around 10.15 p.m. local time, a force of Taliban gunmen attacked Camp Bastion, in Helmand Province, the main strategic base in southwestern Afghanistan.

About 15 insurgents (19 according to some reports), wearing U.S. Army uniforms, organized into three teams, breached the perimeter fence and launched an assault on the airfield, that includes the U.S. Camp Leatherneck and the UK’s Camp Bastion, where British royal Prince Harry, an AH-64 Apache pilot (initially believed to be the main target of the attack) is stationed.

The attackers fired machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and possibly mortars against aircraft parked next to the airport’s runway. Two U.S. Marines were killed in the subsequent fighting whereas eight of 10 AV-8B+ Harrier jets of the Yuma-based Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 211 were destroyed (6) or heavily damaged (2): the worst U.S. air loss in one day since the Vietnam War.

The VMA-211 “Avengers” is part of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing headquartered in San Diego at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar. It deployed to Afghanistan in April and relocated from Kandahar Airfield to Camp Bastion on Jul. 1.

According to Wikipedia, the VMA-211 last suffered this level of losses on Dec. 8, 1941.

Considered that the U.S. Marine Corps are believed to be equipped with slightly more than 120 AV-8B+, the attack on Camp Bastion has wiped out 1/15th of the entire U.S. Jump Jet fleet and a large slice of the Yuma-based squadron. A serious problem for the USMC, that was compelled to buy second hand RAF Harrier GR9s to keep the AV-8B+ in service beyond 2030, when it will be replaced by the F-35B.

Furthermore, the VMA-211 was the only Marine Harrier unit in Afghanistan: until the destroyed airframes will be replaced (most probably, by another Squadron), the coalition ground forces can’t count on the CAS (Close Air Support) provided by the Harrier.

Tom Meyer has contributed to this post.

Image credit: U.S. Marine Corps

5) China unveils its brand new stealth fighter: the J-31 “Falcon Eagle”. But it’s a copy of the F-22 Raptor

Posted on Sept. 16

Pictures of a previously unknown brand new fighter jet have started to appear online over the weekend.

Built by the Shenyang company, the new aircraft, could be the answer of the aerospace firm to the Chengdu J-20, whose two prototypes have already become quite famous across the world since the first images of the large, short-take off and landing stealth plane, leaked on the Chinese defense forums about two years ago.

Image credit: Tixue.net

The new aircraft, coded 31001 (hence, believed to be designated J-31) it’s a sort of copy of the F-22 Raptor the most advanced (and troubled), (multi-role) fighter jet in the U.S. Air Force inventory: same nose section, same twin tails and trapezoidal wings along with the distinctive lines of the stealth design. Anyway, even if it has two engines, the new aircraft doesn’t seem to feature thrust vectoring capabilities. At least on this first prototype.

It has also some F-35-like features, as the air intakes and wings dimensions.

The J-31 is smaller than the J-20, from which it differs for the grey paint job and the presence of a colored emblem on the tails (in place of the typical red star) with the text 鹘鹰, Chinese for “Falcon Eagle”

Image credit: Tixue.net

Although it’s almost impossible to say whether the new aircraft will eventually reach production phase, for sure it proves that China has at least two stealth projects for future combat capable aircraft.

Considered all the cyber attacks targeting Lockheed Martin stealth projects in the last years, one could believe Chinese hackers were able to put their hands on some useful technical drawings of the Raptor. Still, it would be the avionics, radar-evading features, equipment and weapons, rather than the shape, to make the difference in a dogfight. Unless the Chinese will build some thousand examples such jets.

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China’s new military transport plane exposed. And it looks like a C-17, An-70, A400M hybrid.

Posted by Alert5 today, the following image shows the first photographs of China’s new four-engine military airlifter.

The large military transport aircraft is allegedly designed Y-20 and, nose aside, its shape is almost identical to that shown in a series of artist’s impressions that have appeared on Chinese media outlets.

Indeed, the aircraft depicted in the detailed renderings you can find in this post seems to be a turbojet clone of the Airbus A400M Atlas four-engine turboprop, whereas the one depicted on the ground in the new pictures features a nose section inspired by the Antonov An-70.

Actually, inputs from several other aircraft types, including the Boeing C-17, can be found in the Y-20. In July 2009, a former Boeing employee was convicted of selling secret C-17 technical details to China.

It looks like an AWACS version of the Y-20 is also being envisaged.

 

 

 

 

 

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Japan scrambles eight F-15s to intercept Chinese plane that intruded disputed islands airspace

Up to eight F-15 jets were scramble by the JASDF (Japan Air Self Defense Force) in the morning of Dec. 13 (02.00 GMT – 11.00 LT), after a Chinese Harbin Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft skirted one of the disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Accompanied by an E-2 Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning platform, the Japanese “armada” responded to what is the first Chinese incursion into Japan’s airspace near Senkaku islands (that China calls Diaoyu), since Chinese warships have started moving in and out of waters around the islands.

According to China’s State Oceaninc Administration, the unarmed Y-12 (carrying registration B-3837) entered the airspace over the island to join a routing patrol with four surveillance vessels.

“During the patrol, the fleet declared the Chinese government’s stance regarding the Diaoyu Islands to Japanese ships that had illegally entered the waters and asked them to leave the waters,” according to the China Daily news.

Image credit: 163.com

Russian strategic bombers, reconnaissance planes and AWACS skirt Japanese islands (and get photographed) during long range patrol flightsquite often.

During a recent North Korean rocket test, Tokyo dispatched F-15Js to take care of Russian and Chinese spyplanes dispatched to gather data about Tokyo’s Aegis destroyers moved into position in anticipation of Pyongyang’s launch.

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