Even while most people like to attend air shows to see aerobatic display teams performances, they usually don’t know what happens inside the formation, which are the main roles of the team, which are the solo radio calls, and which flight instruments are used during the display.
I’ve seen many Frecce videos, but this one, with 170-minute footage bringing the viewer not only inside the cockpit but also inside the formation in the most unusual attitude, is by far the most interesting and realistic I’ve ever seen.
If you want to know something more about the team, here’s some background info for you.
Based at Rivolto, not far from Udine, in NE Italy, the Frecce Tricolori official designation is 313° Gruppo Addestramento Acrobatico (Aerobatic Training Squadron).
The Frecce Tricolori team is equipped with a modified version of the Alenia Aermacchi MB.339A, a single engine tandem seat training and tactical support aircraft. Apart from the overall blue color scheme, the aircraft differ from the standard model by the presence of the onboard colored smokes generation system.
This device is controlled by two buttons: one on the control stick, for white smoke, and one on the throttle for colored smoke. The system is fed from an underwing fuel tank filled with a coloring agent which is discharged through nozzles placed in the jet exhaust. The agent, vaporized in the jet exhaust, produces a colored trail.
Although every position is key in the overall display, the roles with greater responsibility are the ones of the Commander, the Leader, the First Slot and Solo.
Unlike other display teams, the Frecce’s Commander does not fly with the formation. He is the former Leader and issues instructions from the ground supervising the display both from a technical and a flight safety perspective.
The formation Leader (aircraft numbered #1) guides the whole team, dictating timings and managing separations, opposition passes and rejoins, aided by the First Slot (#6), who flies in the centre, and acts as a reference point for speeds and distances.
The Solo (#10) is tasked with displaying to the public the aircraft’s extreme capabilities in periods when the rest of the formation momentarily exits the air show area to prepare for the next maneuver. He flies an almost independent display program, with highly technical manoeuvres in which the aircraft is pushed to the limits of its envelope.
Formation aerobatics dates back to the end of the ’20s as a means for improving pilot’s skills, and it is still today one of the most important disciplines in the background of a military pilot. At that time formation aerobatics was used to train pilots to follow the formation leader in dogfights, regardless of the aircraft attitude. Still today, formations are a typical feature of military aviation: they are used in combat, for providing mutual cover or reducing the formation radar footprint, and also during peacetime operations for both training and operational purposes, and also for bringing an unexperienced wingman on the ground during a bad weather recovery to the homebase. That’s why, unless they are launched to check an aircraft subsystems after a maintenance work or to test some specific on board or ground equipment, the majority of tactical planes (“tacair”) missions involve at least two aircraft.
Apart from those phases in which the team splits into two sections, the Frecce fly in a standard diamond formation, in which its elements are arranged in five “layers”. The leader is the highest aircraft (hence it occupies the highest layer) while the second slot (#9) is the lowest. The first left wingman and the first slot are responsible for the set up and constitute the perspective reference to the rest of the aircraft. The Frecce aircraft very close to each other: they use a vertical and horizontal separation appearing almost overlapped to the eyes of the spectators.
Instrument flight is reduced to the minimum. The artificial horizon is used for no more than 20 or 30 seconds during the whole display, this being flown “visually”, looking out, maintaining one’s own position by sighting the specific reference points. For almost all the duration of the performance wingmen and slot pilots, have “only” to follow their leader, almost disregarding their position relative to the ground.
According to the weather conditions as well as the topographic characteristics of the location in which the air show is being staged, the Frecce Tricolori can perform three types of program: “high”, “low” or “flat”.
The “high” program is the most spectacular: it is made by an uninterrupted sequence of some thirty figures (among those the Big triangle formation loop, and the Downward Bomb Burst), the performance of which requires on average some 25 minutes. After performing the first part of the program with all ten aircraft, the solo display pilot detaches, alternating his own maneuvers with the ones flown by the remaining nine planes.
Even though to the eyes of a spectator displays don’t change during an entire air show season, the way the “Frecce Tricolori” fly may differ significantly depending on the environment in which aerobatics is executed.
“In the case of displays flown over land, the terrain usually offers a multitude of fixed references which assist in the perception of speed, travelled airspace and altitude, such as crop lines, fields, roads, railways, and rivers” Capt. Piercarlo Ciacchi, Frecce Tricolori’s pilot said.
Over the water, however, it is necessary to use buoys or boats to create the reference points for the pilots for the safe execution of all the maneuvers. “Although usually free of significant obstacles, displays flown over water can hide several traps. In those flown over the sea, the sunlight reflected on the surface may reduce visibility. Displays flown over a lake require even greater concentration on behalf of the pilots, since the absence of significant wave motion, low lake bottoms, and different water salinity amplify the reflective characteristics of the surface, causing the problem of spatial disorientation” Ciacchi explains.
The training which precedes entrance in the formation lasts a little less than six months. It begins with single ship sorties and continues with other missions featuring an increasing number of aircraft. At the end of each training phase, the progress made by the new pilot is certified by a senior member of the formation, who is responsible for assessing if the trainee can proceed to the next one.
The newly assigned pilots enter the formation occupying the rear positions, considered easier and more comfortable to fly.
The Italian Armed Forces Day exhibition, held each year in Rome inside the Circus Maximus (Circo Massimo), always provides an interesting opportunity for a close look at the most interesting equipments of the four Armed Forces [Aeronautica Militare (Italian Air Force), Marina Militare (Italian Navy), Esercito Italiano (Italian Army), and Carabinieri (Military Police)], and of the Italian Armed Corps, as the Guardia Costiera (Coast Guard) and the Guardia di Fin
As I’m writing the final chapter of my series of debriefs about the air war in Libya, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector is not officially ended as it will end on Oct. 31. However, everybody knows by now that on Oct.20 Gaddafi has been captured, wounded and killed and his death has marked, more than any other official statement, the end of the war started on Mar. 19.
Gaddafi was trying to flee Sirte on a large convoy made of around 75 vehicles. The convoy was attacked at 08.30AM LT by a French Mirage 2000 that was called into action by a RAF E-3D AWACS. Gaddafi’s vehicle was intercepted by rebel fighters on the ground and he was killed (after being wounded) as he was being transferred.
Most probably, his decision to escape using such a large convoy was his last mistake. I can’t understand how someone could think that so many vehicles can move unnoticed from the many reconnaissance and intelligence gathering platforms still flying within a No-Fly Zone (increasingly permeable to civilian traffic). Even if almost all the NATO and non-NATO contingents taking part to Unified Protector were reduced during the last months, as the number of strike sorties flown on a daily basis shows, the number of SIGINT assets has remained almost constant.
It was one of these extremely important platforms to intercept a phone call made by Gaddafi in the days preceding the last attack on Sirte.
Even if the bombs dropped by the French combat jet didn’t destroy the whole convoy (two armed vehicles and several accompanying cars), they were decisive to halt it. Therefore, a French plane can claim to have started and (virtually) finished the war in Libya.
Later on Oct. 20, the Pentagon disclosed that a US Predator took part in the attack, firing its Hellfire missiles. Initially it was not clear whether it was the American drone or the French plane to have fired the last (?) weapon of the war but does it really matter?
The last attack
This is how the last strike mission in Libya took place: a Predator monitoring Sirte movements spotted a convoy attempting to flee the city. The convoy was identified as being pro-Gaddafi while attempting to force its way around the outskirts of the city. Since the vehicles had some mounted weapons and ammunitions, the US drone attacked it with Hellfire missiles. As a result of the first attack, only one vehicle was destroyed but many others dispersed in different directions. Shortly after the disruption, about 20 vehicles regrouped and tried to proceed in a southerly direction. NATO again decided to engage these vehicles. Orbiting nearby there was a mixed flight of a Mirage F1CR and a Mirage 2000D that were immediately directed to strike the target. The Mirage 2000D dropped a GBU-12 on the convoy, destroying 11 vehicles.
According to the official statement issued by NATO, at the time of the strike, NATO did not know that Gaddafi was in the convoy and “NATO’s intervention was conducted solely to reduce the threat towards the civilian population, as required to do under our UN mandate. As a matter of policy, NATO does not target individuals.”
As a policy NATO does not divulge specific information on national assets involved in operations. However, as the above text shows, some commanders were more than happy to let the details about their service’s involvement in the “decisive strike” leak.
This brings me to the first of a series of key points and Lessons Learned of this war:
1) Unlike the more effective Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo, Unified Protector represents an example of how an air campaign should not be executed. As I’ve pointed out many times in the previous debriefings, the way the air campaign was conducted and planned, transformed what could have been a quick victory into an almost deadlocked battlefield.
Odyssey Dawn represented just a series of independent national missions: the US, French, British and Italian contingents were not fully integrated, to such an extent that each one had to have its own tankers. When NATO took over and the US stepped back to a support role withdrawing its attack planes, it took 2 months to understand that it was better to start targeting Gaddafi’s capacity to resupply his forces on the front rather than attacking each single vehicle on the frontline. Furthermore, coalition planes went after a large number of ammunition depots throughout the whole air campaign. Since there were 4000 in Libya, a wiser move would have been to attack the most important ones in the early stages of the air campaign, in order to prevent loyalist forces from being able to fight for about 7 months. Consider that 80 days since the beginning of Odyssey Dawn (then Unified Protector) NATO still had some fixed targets (like C2 sites, national intelligence centre, State TV antennas, and so on) to attack even if these targets should be hit in the very early phases of any offensive air campaign.
For this reason, in spite of the official statements, NATO has been criticised by the rebels and by many analysts for being too cautious. In my opinion this was caused by a series of reasons: a UN Security Council Resolution that was open to different interpretations and that prevented the alliance to strike Gaddafi forces if they were not threatening civilians; caveats and strict ROE imposed by those partner nations facing internal struggles and that could not “afford” the risk of collateral damages (UAE AF took part to the air strikes even if the news was initially kept secret but only attacking fixed ground targets); the need to provide cover to the “freedom fighters” in a typical TIC (Troops In Contact) scenario without troops on the ground; and the lack, especially at the beginning, of a direct contact and a standard communication protocol with the rebels.
By comparison, in 78 days of air strikes in Serbia in 1999, NATO flew 38.004 sorties, 14.112 of those were strike sorties. During Allied Force, on average, 487 sorties were launched each day, 180 being strike sorties, even if during the beginning phases of the war and towards the end, when the air strikes against the Serbian ground forces became more intense, the alliance flew more than 700 sorties every day with roughly one third being bombing missions. These figures shows how the operation in former Jugoslavia focused on a quick achievement of the air superiority and a subsequent intense use of the air power against the ground targets. A successful approach that was not followed in Libya.
To date, in more than 200 days of air operations, Nato has flown 26.323 sorties, including 9.658 strike sorties.
2) Some nations contributed actively to the Libyan air war, whereas others took part to Unified Protector almost only on paper. Furthermore, a war is always an opportunity for air forces to show their capabilities, to test their most modern equipment in a real environment and to fire live ordnance. However, along with “operational” purposes, there can be “propaganda” purposes too. Some services have seen their budgets cut over the last few years to such an extent that entire fleets have been grounded with (modern) aircraft retired earlier than initially planned. Intense and successful air ops during the Libyan air war have given them the opportunity to ask for the budget needed to save some planes from defense cuts.
For example, the RAF Sentinel R1 spyplane have provided important data about enemy movements in Libya, helping planners to choose among those targets detected by its onboard sensors. However, the Sentinel will be phased out in 3 years, when British troops will return from Afghanistan, merely 8 years after it was taken on charge. Given its good performance in Libya, the decision to withdraw from service the Sentinel so early might be reviewed.
I’m sure that many readers of this blog remember my article titled “RAF Tornados firing 900K Euro missiles in 8-hour round-trip mission from the UK: is the war in Libya a marketing campaign?” following the Royal Air Force’s proud annoucement of a Long-Range Libya mission from RAF Marham involving six Tornados carrying state-of-the-art (and costly) Storm Shadow missiles. It was extremely weird that such kind of weapon [whose unit price is about 900.000 Euro (£790,000 = 1.3 Milion USD)] was still needed in Libya after more than 100 days of air campaign, after the enemy’s air defenses both manned and unmanned (missiles) had been completely wiped out and that the mission was conducted from the UK instead of using some of the 16 Tonkas already deployed in Italy. Wasn’t the RAF trying to show that the lack of aircraft carriers does not limit the UK’s capability to project its firepower at long distance?
Anyway, not only the UK’s RAF was involved in this sort of “propaganda war”. Especially at the beginning of the air campaign, there was a “race” to claim the first air strike, the first air strike on Tripoli, the first air-to-air victory that could strengthen one nation’s foreign policy or a particular aircraft’s reputation for export purposes. Indeed I’m not sure the Rafale and the Typhoon would have been so extensively involved in Libya if they were not shortlisted in the Indian Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender.
For instance, on Mar. 26, French aircraft carried out several strikes around Misratah which, according to the French MoD “would indicate the destruction on the ground at Misratah of at least five Soko G-2 Galeb combat planes”. Various media headlines talked about “7 aircraft shot down” or “Gaddafi’s war planes downed”, even if those could not be considered air-to-air victories.
Later disclosed satellite imagery rendered available by the AAAS website at the following link showed that the French Air Force hadn’t shot down any aircraft and, above all, that those destroyed on the ground were far from being prepared for a sortie in the region as the French MoD press update explained: they were unserviceable Mig-23s originally captured by the rebels on Feb. 24 and then sabotaged, with the removal of their nose before the regime counterattack! Better intelligence, accurate reconnaissance, would have prevented allies from wasting LGBs.
3) If some nations and their air forces struggled to get media attention, others were compelled to keep a “low profile” for internal struggles. Italy is among them: while the RAF, the French and Danish air forces provided daily or weekly detailed bulletin about the missions flown in Libya, the amount of bombs dropped on specific targets and so on, there is very little information about the sorties flown by the Italian AF and Navy. For weeks, almost everyone thought that there was only one aircraft carrier off the Libyan coasts (the French Charles De Gaulle) while there was also the Italian Garibaldi full of AV-8B Harriers performing air strikes as well as NFZ enforcement missions. Even if the Italian MoD has affirmed that Italian contribution to Unified Protector has been second only to the one of the UK and France contingents, the actual amount of flown sorties and PGMs delivered has not been undisclosed. For this reasons, all the info I was able to provide on my debriefs about the Italian commitment was obtained by official sources or from the services’ websites.
Something similar happened for the U.S. whose support to Unified Protector was vital: without American tankers, there would not be any NATO air campaign. Predators and Global Hawks (offen recalled by Washington-centric media) were important as well as some special ops assets (spyplanes, PSYOPS, EW) the actual added value of the American contribution to Unified Protector was the air-to-air refueling capability. Other partner nations contributed with some tankers (Italy, France, UK, Sweden and Canada): not the amount needed by this kind of air campaign.
Anyway, since the U.S. stepped back and handed the leadeship of the air campaign over to NATO, many details of the American intervention were not unveiled, most probably because of the criticism that would accompany a broader involvement in a long lasting war. For example, the Predator drones were already flying over Libya at least two or three days before President Obama announced that the MQ-1s would strengthen NATO’s strike capability.
As many aircraft enthusiasts noticed, the Malta LiveATC.net feed was shut off towards the end of June. Officially, it was a computer problem, however, since the LMML airport was immediately removed from the list of airfields covered by the service, there are rumours that the local feeder was asked to cease “relaying” Malta ACC and TWR comms to the rest of the world using the web. I think that the end of the Malta streaming is more linked to the need to keep some information confidential rather than a concern for the security of the air operations. The Malta feed enabled everybody to listen to the radio comms of many of the aircraft involved in the air campaign as they transited through the Malta FIR (Flight Information Region) contacting Maltase air traffic control. In this way, you could listen to a traffic self-identifying itself as a “MQ-1″ (hence a Predator) going tactical while entering the Libyan airspace some days before it became official. I’m pretty sure that the concern dealt with the risk that such information spread before it was public and for this reason the feed was shut off (temporarily?).
Image source: USAF
4) Some air forces have suffered bomb shortage after dropping few hundred PGMs in the first three months of the war. This is unacceptable. European coalition partners ran out of bombs too early and asked other nations to replenish their almost empy stocks.
Wars can come unannounced and air forces can’t be found unprepared to that.
US SECDEF condemned European nations for years of shrinking defense budgets that have forced the US to play, once again, a major role in the NATO operation. With frustration, he said:
“The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country, yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.”
5) Coalition planes flew undisturbed over Libya. The residual Libyan Arab Air Force did not pose any threat during the whole air campaign. However, NATO air defense planes flew a lot of Defensive Counter Air missions and the majority of the violations of the No Fly Zonewere made by rebel planes trying to support freedom fighters with isolated uncoordinated, appearantly unauthorized, sorties.
6) British attack helicopters were not decisive whereas French choppers were crucial. Flying in pairs, the British Apaches on board HMS Ocean completed roughly 50 combat sorties striking 100 targets in the coastal areas of Brega and Tripoli. On the other side, the French combat helicopters flew around 300 combat sorties and destroyed more than 500 targets.
The French choppers flew within strike packages that consisted of 2-6 Gazelles armed with HOT-ATGMs, 2 Tigers and 2 Puma, in cooperation with maritime gunfire support. The French usually deployed their helicopters within the frame of tightly-integrated strike packages, usually consisting of between 2 and 6 HOT ATGM-armed Gazelles, 2 Tigres and 2 Pumas (flying-CP and for CSAR), and in cooperation with naval gunfire support (100 and 76mm calibre rounds). “They have destroyed most of what was left of the regime’s armoured and mechanized forces (what was left after the wholesale destruction of the 32AB near Benghazi, on 19-21 March, and after the failure of assaults on Misurata)” Tom Cooper of ACIG.org commented.
The first Italian aircraft to be deployed in Afghanistan has been a Bell UH-1N Twin Huey helicopter in a version built under license by Agusta and designated AB-212. Both the Aeronautica Militare (Italian Air Force) and the Marina Militare (Italian Navy) have been called to support ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force) multinational force with the AB.212, that can fulfil a wide variety of tasks, from MEDEVAC, to reconnaissance, to personnel transportation, to special forces ops.
The 21° Gruppo of the Italian Air Force has conducted several Tour of Duty in Afghanistan. Since 2005, it is equipped with the AB.212ICO (Implementazione Capacità Operative – Operational Campabilities Implementation) a retrofitted version of the previous AMI-SAR model that was upgraded in anticipation to the deployment to Kabul and surrounding areas, where the high-altitude environment is not suitable with the other CSAR helicopter in ItAF inventory, the old fashioned HH-3F that suffered a tragic incident in 2008. The AB.212ICO is equipped with two manually activated Flares dispensers for self-protection and can carry two MG 42/59 caliber 7.62 mm NATO machine guns on both sides of the fuselage. It wears an armored cockpit and fuselage to protect the 2 pilots and 2 gunners from small arms; noteworthy, the rudder area, vulnerable to bullets shot from the ground because of the observation windows, has been shielded with 3 inches of kevlar.
The new outfit has cost the aircraft half of its original endurance, currently limited to 1 hour and 40 minutes, and the increased weight, in Afghanistan, at an average height of 7.000 feet AMSL (Above Mean Sea Level), with ground temperature often above 40° Celsius, makes the AB.212 unable to recover a survivor from the ground with the hoist.
To board people, the Twin Huey has to land. A minor problem as the following pictures taken by Capt. Giacomo Andreotti at 9,100 feet, on top a mountain in central Italy, during a routine mission of the 21° Gruppo a proud member of the NATO Tiger Association, based at Grazzanise.
High-altitude can be tricky for rotary wings: first, because of the loss of engine power; second for the loss of rotor lift caused by the thin air. That’s why helicopters suitable for high altitudes need plenty of excess power that can be spent to overcome the reduced lift and engine performance.
The AB.212 will be employed until 2014-2015 when it is expected to be replaced with a CSAR version of the AW-101.
Unlike all the reports I’ve written since April, this one comes in days of renewed interest about the current situation Libya. Hence, mass media have restarted publishing articles about Libya (even if sometimes reports lacked accuracy).
So, I will not write a detailed recap of what happened on the battlefield, trying to focus on the most interesting or weird things.
Noteworthy U.S. media have treated the war in a Washington-centric way. Surely the U.S. supported Operation Unified Protector but only with ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance), EW (Electronic Warfare), SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses), PSYOPS, AAR (Air-to-Air Refueling) and few (if compared to the others) Predator strikes (read Pt.1 below).
Nevertheless everybody know by now that Tripoli is in rebel hands after a (quick) rebel assault supported by NATO firepower and that Gaddafi has escaped using the network of tunnels that interconnects his headquarters in the capital with the airport, Rixos Hotel, and many other locations (some of which in the desert).
Anyway, what’s clear is that:
a) Even if the rebels moved additional units in direction of Tripoli, were backed by western Special Forces on the ground (many of which worked as old-fashioned FAC – Forward Air Controllers) and by NATO’s firepower, it’s at least surprising that the remnants of the regime troops in Tripoli withdrew or surrendered so quickly. Even Bab al-Aziziya, a nuclear-resistant heavily fortified bunker was infiltrated with only a couple of days of fighting (and some bombs).
b) Gaddafi (“Gathafi” according to his passport, found inside the Bab al-Aziziya bunker along with his hat, an album filled with photos of Condoleeza Rice) is not going to give up. Soldiers and snipers aside, he still manages a wide network of loyal intel officers that keep him very well informed about the rebels and the NTC. Some are believed to be also infiltrated among the rebel ranks. Obviously, until he’s captured, dead or alive, the rebels can’t declare a victory.
As already said, the regime can exploit the underground facilities located below Tripoli. This network includes not only bunkers capable of surviving near-direct hits by nuclear weapons, but also extensive storage facilities. Tunnels, that can be used to move unobserved from one place to another, and depots, some of which have been discovered in other regions of the country, can give loyalists time and ammunitions to retreat, hide, regorganize and then fight for extended periods of time.
As the war has reached downtown Tripoli, I think rebels will mostly have to rely on their own forces. Snipers have been hiding on top buildings (they were found in the vicinity of the Rixos Hotel where journalists were seized before being freed with money and written clearance to shot down civilians) and combatants units suddenly appear everywhere. In a urban fight scenario, it will not be easy for NATO planes to hit Gaddafi forces avoiding collateral damages or blue-on-blue episodes, even if they are helped by SAS FACs working with “boots on the ground” with the rebels. For this reason, NATO has conducted few sorties in the area in the last few days with some partner nations, like Italy, not taking part to the air strikes within urban areas.
Helicopters, are much more suitable for such a scenario, but I’ve not read any report about the British Apaches being used over the capital, perhaps for the residual risk of anti-aircraft artillery, MANPADS and SAMs. The accuracy of an Apache 30mm gun attack is particularly evident in this video, taken years ago in Iraq, that gives an idea of the impressive firepower provided by an AH-64D.
c) Even if the regime was taken by surprise by the sudden collapse of the 32AB’s and by the quick advance of the rebels into Tripoli backed by NATO airstrikes, its military was able to recover because all the rebel units were initially sent into Tripoli and were not used to cut off the capital with the regime stronghold of Tarhouna and Beni Wallid, to the southeast. A major road between the two cities and the capital, enabling pro-Gaddafi forces to bring in supplies, was secured on Aug. 24 when rebels took Tarhouna and cut off the regime forces between Tripoli and Sirte and Beni Wallid garrisons.
Map credit: @4Adam
The last major battle is being fought outside Sirte where, in fact, last day’s NATO air strikes focused. Rebels are approaching the last Gaddafi’s stronghold from all directions.
On Aug. 25, 29 armed vehicles and one command and control center have been hit in the area where the power is down has a consequence of the new frontline lying the vicinity of Gaddafi’s home town Sirte.
British Tornados, operating out of RAF Marham, fired Storm Shadow cruise missiles at a headquarters in the town of Sirte, in the night between Aug. 25 and 26. See also Pt. 4 below.
Fighting is also reported, in the town of Sebha, in Southern Libya.
d) Latest reports give Sirte as Gaddafi’s hideout. Italian Foreign Ministry Franco Frattini has recently affirmed that there were news he could try to reach Algeria through the desert while many believe that he is still in Tripoli.
Indeed at 15.55 local time on Aug. 25, rebels surrounded several appartment houses near the eastern gate of Bab al-Aziziya complex (slightly outside of it) and attacked it believing “the Colonel” was inside even if he wasn’t there.
Weeks before Tripoli was taken by rebels, the news spread of Venezuelan or South African airplanes in either Tripoli or Djerba ready to evacuate Gaddafi and his relatives.
e) Hard fighting took place at Tripoli IAP, on Aug 25. When they had conquered it few days before, rebels took possession of the Afriqiya airplanes based there, some of which were dedicated to the transportation of Gaddafi and his family. The most famous one is the VIP Airbus A340-213, MSN 151, registration “5A-ONE”, ex HZ-WBT4. The aircraft became famous at the beginning of the uprising when it was believed to be used by Gaddafi to escape in Venezuela or elsewhere. IIRC the aircraft can’t fly because it lacks maintenance activity that Lufthansa (?) refused to perform to the Gaddafi’s plane.
However, regime forces managed to hit three different aircraft there one of which Airbus A300 “5A-IAY” burned out. An Airbus of BuraqAir was reported hit but only damaged while CNN aired images of burning A300B4-620 “5A-DLZ.” An ex-LAAF C-130H, full of 14.5 and 106 mm ammo, appears to have survived too.
Image sources: Reuters and CNN
f) In the last days there have been several reports of Scud launched by the regime forces in the Sirte area towards Misratah. The news spread, following a post on AJE that at least one of them was intercepted by a NATO plane. I immediately answered to all those who asked me to comment the news that it was quite unlikely that a plane could be able to hit a flying Scud. I tweeted that it had to be a Scud on its TEL/launcher or the missile was intercepted by an AEGIS cruiser off the Libyan coasts.
NATO has not confirmed that any airplane has shot down the missile and The Guardian has reported that at least four Scuds have been intercepted before they were due to impact on the city by missiles fired by a USN cruiser operating in the Gulf of Sirte.
Other interesting information, things and thoughts:
1) Since the beginning of the NATO operation (Mar. 31, 2011, 06.00GMT) a total of 20.395 sorties, including 7.681 strike sorties, have been conducted.
Someone has tried to recap the number of sorties flown to date by each contingent, even if it is extremely difficult since there’s a general lack of detailed information. Many are interested in U.S. figures. Citing the Pentagon, Reuters reported that from Apr. 1 (beginning of Unified Protector) to 07.00 CET to Aug. 22, U.S. has conducted 5.316 sorties: 1.210 were strike sorties, 101 of those Predator ones. Number of U.S. strike sorties that dropped ordnance: 262.
During the same period, NATO has conducted 19.994 sorties, including 7.541 strike sorties. This means that US has conducted 26,5% of all sorties and 16% of the air strikes.
3) French contingent, since Aug.18 has provided 65% of air strikes according to the French MoD. France has deployed one Harfang UAV to Sigonella that has flown the first mission over Libya on Aug. 24.
Image source: French MoD
4) The UK’s Royal Air Force has proudly announced a recent Long-Range Libya mission involving six Tornados carrying state-of-the-art (and costly) Storm Shadow missiles. According to this article on the Service’s website, on Aug. 10 night, six GR4s armed with stand-off missiles, conducted a round-trip mission over Libya “to target elements of Colonel Qadhafi’s military command and control facilities and air defence infrastructure.” This means that the aircraft flew long range sorties from RAF Marham and RAF Lossiemouth carrying 2 Storm Shadows each, for a total of 12 missiles.
A similar mission was flown between Aug. 25 and 26 to attack a Gaddafi headquarters in Sirte area.
Dealing with the Typhoon, the 6 FGR4 deployed to Gioia del Colle had dropped 100 bombs by Aug. 9, when an article about Sqn Ldr Jody McMeekin achieving his 1.000th flying hour on the Eurofighter was published on the RAF website.
6) Mermaid Dawn is the (translated) name of the rebel ground advance into Tripoli. It is neither a NATO nor U.S. codename.
7) After publishing images of the Italian Libya patches, here are some French ones (thanks to FX!).
8) Some more details have been made available about the BAF commitment in Op. Unified Protector (thanks to @youssefsan for the info). The MoD has said that the 6 Belgian F-16s made 448 missions (even if these should be sorties), worth 1.890 flying hours, and dropped 365 bombs (97% hit their target).
The Aviationist patch
Send me an email if you want to support this site buying the original TheAviationist.com patch, only available through this website!