Once again, Flightradar24.com provides an insight into military operations. This time, the Russian air bridge to Syria.
Some days ago we explained how everyone (including low-tech terrorists “armed” with a mobile device and an Internet connection), could have the operational equivalent of a ground-based radar detection system to predict (and avoid) U.S. airstrikes and reconnaissance missions thanks to ADS-B, Multilateration, online tracking systems and some poor OPSEC procedures.
However, American and NATO planes are not the only ones that can be tracked on the Internet: there is a widespread tendency to leave the transponder turned on while flying close or inside sensitive areas.
For instance, in the last few days, Flightradar24 exposed the Russian military airlift from Sevastopol, in Crimea, and other bases in Russia to Syria.
On Sept. 7, two A124 Condor airlifter could be tracked until landing at Latakia, Syria.
RFF8058 (82040) from Krymsk and RFF8056 (82039) from Mozdok A124s both landed it Latakia, Syria today
On Sept. 9, aviation enthusiasts from all around the world tracked as much as five An-124 Condor airlifters heading towards Syria. An additional one could be tracked on Sept. 10.
Unlike the flights tracked on the previous days, the six cargo planes spotted on Sept. 9 and 10 took an easterly roundabout route to avoid the airspaces of Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus, closed to Russian aircraft supporting the military buildup in Syria.
According to several sources, at least four aircraft went through Iran/Iraq.
An-124 on roundabout route Sept. 10
Interestingly, aviation enthusiasts monitored also some Syrian Air flights of IL-76 carrying registration YK-ATA that, on Aug 22 and 28, made roundtrip flights from Latakia to Moscow on the easterly Iran/Iraq route.
Syrian IL-76T [YK-ATA] cargo aircraft returning to Syria [Latakia] after a round trip to Moscow Vnukovo #FR24pic.twitter.com/ZsdwYjMPdN
Not only are An-124s flown to Syria lately. Other Russian flights from Russia to Syria include an Il-62, RA-86496, and EMERCOM (Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations) Il-76, RA-76429: the first one visited Latakia on Aug. 12, 28 and on Sept. 7, using a route via Bulgaria, and on Sept. 10, using a route via Belarus – Poland – Serbia that avoided closed airspaces.
Russian Air Force Il-62 to Syria via Bulgaria
Russian Air Force Il-62 to Syria avoiding Bulgaria
Last time the EMERCOM Il-76 was in Latakia was on Aug. 17 but Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations planes visit Syria every now and then.
Bad OPSEC (Operations Security) exposed by Air War on ISIS?
“Loose Tweets Destroy Fleets” is the slogan (based on the U.S. Navy’s WWII slogan “Loose Lips Sink Ships”) that the U.S. Air Force Central Command used a couple of weeks ago for an article aimed at raising airmen awareness about the risk of sharing sensitive information on social media.
Indeed, the AFCENT article speaks directly to the threat posed by Islamic State supporters who, according to Stripes, on at least two occasions have acquired and posted online personal data of military personnel, urging sympathizers, “lone wolves,” to attack Americans in the States and overseas in retaliation for the air strikes.
The article highlights the importance of proper OPSEC to keep sensitive information away from the enemy and to prevent leakage of information that could put missions, resources and members at risk, “and be detrimental to national strategic and foreign policies.”
Interestingly, the article only focuses on the smart use of social media. Ok, however, there are other possible OPSEC violations that the U.S. Air Force (as well as many other air arms currently supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, in Iraq and Syria, or Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan) should be concerned of.
USAF C-146A Wolfhound of the 524th Special Operations Squadron
During the last few months many readers have sent us screenshots they took on FR24.com or PF.net (that only collect ADS-B broadcast by aircraft in the clear) showing military planes belonging to different air forces over Iraq or Afghanistan: mainly tankers and some special operations planes.
Canadian tanker
We have informed the U.S. Air Force and other air forces that their planes could be tracked online, live, several times, but our Tweets (and those of our Tweeps who retweeted us) or emails have not had any effect as little has changed. Maybe they don’t consider their tankers’ racetrack position or the area of operations of an MC-12 ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) aircraft a sensitive information…
During Libya air war, you could track Canadian tankers circling over the Mediterranean Sea while they refueled allied planes heading to bomb Gaddafi. Three years later, nothing has changed.
Flightradar24 and PlaneFinder are two famous Web-based services that let aviation enthusiasts, curious people, journalists and, generally speaking, anyone who has an Internet access on their computer, laptop or smartphone, track flights in real-time.
These portals/services (some features are not free) rely on a network of several hundred feeders around the world who receive and share Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders data.
The ADS-B system uses a special transponder that autonomously broadcasts data from the aircraft’s on-board navigation systems about its GPS-calculated position, altitude and flight path. This information is transmitted on 1090 MHz frequency: ground stations, other nearby aircraft (thus enhancing situational awareness) as well as commercial off-the-shelf receivers available on the market as well as home-built ones, tuned on the same frequency can receive and process those data.
Flightradar24 and PlaneFinder have a network of several hundred feeders around the world who make the flight information received by their home kits available for anybody. Obviously, only ADS-B equipped aircraft flying within the coverage area of the network are visible.
Actually, in those areas where coverage is provided by several different ground stations, the position of the position of the aircraft can also be calculated for those planes that do not broadcast their ADS-B data using Multilateration (MLAT).
MLAT (used by FR24) uses Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA): by measuring the difference in time to receive the signal from aircraft from four different receivers, the aircraft can be geolocated and followed even if it does not transmit ADS-B data.
Although the majority of the aircraft you’ll be able to track using a browser (or smartphone’s app) are civil airliners and business jets, military aircraft are also equipped with Mode-S ADS-B-capable transponder.
But, these are usually turned off during real war ops.
US Air Force C-32Bs (a military version of the Boeing 757 operated by the Department of Homeland Security and US Foreign Emergency Support Team to deploy US teams and special forces in response to terrorist attacks), American and Russian “doomsday planes”, tanker aircraft and even the Air Force One, along with several other combat planes can be tracked every now and then on both FR24.com and PF.net.
Obviously, Web-based flight tracking services have become so famous and easy to operate, that air arms around the world know very well how to deal with them. Or at least they should know it.
Three years later, little has changed even though many pilots have confirmed that they are well aware of the above mentioned websites and for this reason are instructed to turn off their transponders when involved in real operations.
A U.S. plane possibly supporting ground troops in Afghanistan acting as an advanced communication relay can be regularly tracked as it circles over the Ghazni Province. As we explained in August, the aircraft did not broadcast its mission callsign, but based on the hex code FR24 could identify it as a Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft, an advanced ultra long-range business jet that has been modified by the U.S. Air Force to accommodate Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) payload.
The presence of the orbiting E-11A (the last one monitored on Oct. 12, see the below FR24.com screenshot) could expose an imminent air strike, jeopardizing an entire operations.
Few days ago, during one the very first British air strikes on ISIS in Iraq, the RAF A330 Voyager tanker that accompanied the RAF Tornado GR4 fighter bombers could be tracked on Planefinder.net well inside Jordan’s airspace (see below), exposing its route from RAF Akrotiri airbase in Cyprus. No big deal, until that route overflies countries that are not happy to let the world know they are somehow supporting the US-led coalition.
Since the first appearance during a combat mission the RAF tanker has disappeared from “Internet” on the following days, a sign that the ADS-B “show” was a single mishap.
Anyway, FR24.com, PF.net or home-made kits are extremely interesting and powerful tools to investigate, study and learn about civil and military aviation (in a legal way); air forces around the world have only to take them into proper account when executing combat missions in the same way other details, such as radio communications policies and EMCON (Emission Control) restrictions, are while planning war sorties.
Image credit: Planefinder.net and Flightradar24.com screenshots
At least seven Taliban militants were killed following a NATO air raid Afghanistan. Noteworthy, a sign of the developing operation may have been a U.S. Air Force E-11A BACN plane orbiting over southeasern Ghazni province, clearly visible on Flightradar24.com.
Although many military aircraft are equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders they are usually turned off during real war operations. In fact, by automatically broadcasting the plane’s callsign, GPS position, speed and altitude, these special transponders provide information about the plane can be received by ground stations, by other nearby aircraft (thus enhancing situational awareness) and also by commercial off-the-shelf or home-built receivers.
Flightradar24 and PlaneFinder have a network of several hundred feeders around the world who make the flight information received by their home kits available for anybody on their websites, or by means of their smartphone apps.
Three years later, a U.S. plane involved in war mission over Afghanistan could be monitored for several hours as it circled at 41,000 feet to the southeast of Ghazni.
The aircraft did not broadcast its mission callsign, but based on the hex code FR24 could identify it as a Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft, an advanced ultra long-range business jet that has been modified by the U.S. Air Force to accomodate Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) payload.
Within the U.S. Air Force, the modified jet is designated E-11A.
BACN is technological “gateway” system that allows aircraft with incompatible radio systems and datalinks to exchange tactical information and communicate.
By orbiting at high-altitude, BACN equipped air assets provide a communications link from ground commanders to their allies in the sky regardless of the type of the supporting aircraft and in a non-line-of-sight (LOS) environment. In the rugged, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, troops are not always able to establish LOS communications with close support aircraft overhead and moving position or relocating to higher ground could be fatal. In such situation, a legacy USAF A-10 attack aircraft could loiter away from the battlefield while using the BACN link to communicate with a special-forces Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) on the ground until all targeting information is ready before “un-masking” and beginning an attack run.
The BACN system is also deployed onboard EQ-4B Global Hawk UAVs.
Some 72 hours after contact with the Boeing 777 flying over the Gulf of Thailand was lost, what really happened to Malaysia Airlines MH370 flight remains a mystery.
That said, we can surely sum up what we currently know and what we still don’t know about the fate of the Boeing 777 9M-MRO flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on Mar. 8, 2014.
Facts:
Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 has disappeared from radars about 40 minutes after take off from Kuala Lumpur. According to the ADS-B data the wide body was cruising at 35,000 feet at 471 knots. Last ADS-B data from the aircraft was collected at 17:21:03.
Weather was fairly good and no turbulence was reported before the aircraft was lost.
Between 17:19 and 17:20 the aircraft turned right, changing heading from 25 to 40 degrees. Someone said this is a sign the aircraft was turning back to Kuala Lumpur or had already experienced an in-flight problem. However, the change in heading was probably performed in accordance with the FPL (Flight Plane) as the plane did the same, at the same position, on Mar. 4, 2014.
The last location tracked by Flightradar24 is Lat: 6.97 Lon: 103.63.
The FR24 coverage in that area is good up to 30,000 feet: at lower altitudes, aircraft are invisible to the network’s receiving stations.
What happened after 17:21:03?
ADS-B transponders transmit data twice per second but FlightRadar24.com samples data (speed, position, altitude) every 10-60 second depending on altitude: MH370 data was collected every half minute during the last 10 minutes.
So, the receiving station was expecting to collect and store data from MH370 around 17:21:33. Since no data was saved past 17:21:03 there are three possibilities:
a) The aircraft disintegrated mid-air;
b) The aircraft plunged more than 5,000 feet in 30 seconds (from 35,000 to less than 30,000, where, as said, it was invisible to radars): a steep dive that would equal to 10,000 feet per minute rate of descent or more;
c) The aircraft onboard ADS-B transponder was switched off or failed.
What we don’t know yet:
Since no debris was found yet, we don’t know what happened aboard MH370. Actually, we can’t even be 100 percent sure it crashed (even if it is likely). As already explained, it may take days or weeks to find the debris at sea, months to recover parts of the plane from the sea (even though the Gulf of Thailand is not as deep as the Atlantic Ocean and recovery would be faster than that of AF447 which crashed in 2009).
It is still hard to say whether the two passengers using stolen passports had an active role in the mishap.
Several theories:
– Structural collapse: unlikely. The aircraft was flying at cruising altitude. No turbulence reported. Still, possible.
– Hijacking went wrong: the crew may have suffered a cockpit intrusion and the aircraft might have plunged because of a fight in the cockpit. Or the hijacking attempt may have been conducted by the pilot or copilot (as happened for recent Ethiopian airlines flight).
– Terrorist attack: possible, even if the lack of claim of responsibility makes it a bit less likely as time goes by.
– Suicide: unlikely, as suicide victim usually leaves a message behind.
– Uncommanded bomb detonation: terrorists were carrying a bomb to China, but the bomb detonated unexpectedly.
– Unknown aircraft system failure: a catastrophic failure to any on board system or the lack of cabin pressurization that forced the crew to perform a sudden steep descent but left the plane uncontrollable or the crew unconscious as is dived towards the sea. The fact that the crew did not radio any mayday is not relevant: “aviate, navigate, communicate” meaning that before using the radio pilots have to keep the aircraft in the air, navigate towards the nearest landing field and then communicate the emergency to the ATC (Air Traffic Control).
– Midair collision with another plane: much unlikely. At 35,000 feet both aircraft should have been under radar control or at least visible, unless it was some sort of military/stealth plane climbing to or descending from higher altitudes.
– Missile: fired from a ship or from another plane, by mistake or on purpose (unlikely).
All the articles about MH370 can be read here (scroll down).
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